Philosophie...

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Re: Philosophie...

Post  Admin on Thu 24 Mar - 8:02

Hello everyone! For this week it's a new book very interesting… I'd begun a book on probabilities… then I'll can't put in my articles but I'll try to translate that otherwise. I learned for example, than quantum mechanics are just that,many probabiblities,many ways in the same direction… But I don't know again how I'll be able to explain it in my article by words… For this week,It's a good book of thinking stuff…
The Law of the New Thought/William Walker Atkinson (all the books here come from the web easy to find…)

Thoughts are things:Every thought that we think starts in motion thought-waves, or vibrations, which travel along with greater or lesser speed and intensity, varying with the force of the original thought, and which affect,more or less, people far removed from the persons sending forth the thought. We are constantly sending forth thought influence, and are constantly receiving thought waves from others. I don't now refer to thoughts deliberately sent out to the mind of another, or thoughts deliberately received by one from the mind of another , according to the well-known, and well established,laws of Telepathy , but to the equally real, but far less understood, unconscious sending forth and receiving of thoughts, which's going on in each of us all the time.
Of course these are all different manifestations of what we call Telepathy, or thought-transference, but the term is generally used to designate the conscious sending and receiving of mental messages.
This power of thought-transference is being continually exercised by all people,generally indirectly and unconsciously. Our thoughts create vibrations which are sent forth in waves in all directions, and affect more or less all persons with whose minds they come in contact. We can see instances of this in everyday life. Men are affected by the thoughts of others in business, on the street, in the theatre, in church, and in fact everywhere. Public opinion is largely formed by the thoughts of a number of vigorous,positive thinkers, sent forth in thought-waves, rapidly influencing by the whole country, the thought-wave gaining force as it progresses, being added to by the thought vibrations of everyone whom it affects. Great waves of popular feeling sweep over the country carrying before them all except those who understand the laws of mental influence, and who have protected themselves against these outside impressions. The combined thought-waves of the majority of the people beat against the mind of the individual and exercise an almost irresistible influence.
There's one very important fact in this study of the power of thought vibrations, which every man or woman should constantly carry in mind.
I refer to the fact that the law of « like attracts like » maintains in the thought-world, and that one attracts to himself the thoughts of others which correspond in kind with those held by himself. A man who hates will attract to himself all the Hateful and Malicious thought-waves within a large radius,and these added thoughts act as fuel to the fire of his base feelings, and render him more hateful and hating than ever. One who thinks love,and has outgrown the old negative thoughts of imperfect development, will not attract these negative thoughts to him. They will pass him by, hurrying on some point of attraction in the minds of others who are thinking along the same lines. And the man who thinks love will attract to himself all the loving thoughts within his circle of influence.
Men instinctively recognize this force when they gather in the same neighborhood with others in the same line of thought. Communities have their individualities just as persons do. Every village,town, and city has its own peculiarities, which are noticeable to those who enter it.
And strangers moving into these communities gradually take on the characteristics of the place, unless the same prove very uncongenial to them,in which case they manage to move away from the town as soon as possible, and aren't contended so long as they are within its borders. It's well to be surrounded by those whose thoughts are akin to our own, as we thus add to each other's power and are comparatively free from outside disturbing influences. Of course persons may be practice, and understanding,make themselves positive to the thoughts of others, and may with impunity allow themselves to be surrounded with persons of an entirely different line of thought, and may even,when so doing, attract to themselves, from greater distances,the thoughts which are harmonize with their own.

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Re: Philosophie...

Post  Admin on Wed 30 Mar - 11:00

Hello everyone! In this end of the month, I chosed something simple… It's the continuity of last week in the book:The law of the new thought#William Walker Atkinson. It's a reasoning about the roots of our knowledge and mentality and the direction of this one…
Mind Building : To the advanced man is reserved the proud privilege of consciously building up his mind into any desired shape,the privilege of altering,repairing, and adding to the mental structure. In the lower animals,primitive man,and even the majority of men today, the work of building up the mind is largely performed by forces outside of himself, environment,associations,suggestions,etc, and, of course, even the most advanced man is subject to these influences. But the developed man knows that he, himself, has a hand in the building up of his mind. This building, of course, is done altogether in the subconscious field, the conscious thought supplying the material and the 'I' bring the builder. In a previous chapter, I have spoken to the subconscious plane of the mind, and how it's being added to, each day, by thoughts of the conscious plane of our own mind, the thoughts of others, suggestions, and so on. I have also compared the subconscious plane of mentation to a body of water into which a clear stream was flowing, and showed how the character of the entire body of water depended upon the quality of the water that was pouring in.
The subconscious mind may also be compared to an immense warehouse, into which goods are being carried and stored. It will readily be seen that the character of the contents of the warehouse must be determined by the grade and quality of the goods being carried in from day to day. This being granted, it will readily be seen how important becomes the selection of these mental goods which are being stored away.
The subconscious plane of the mind is an immense storehouse into which we are continually carrying goods to be stored away for future use. And,moreover,these goods are being constantly used. The greater part of our thinking is done along the lines of subconscious mentation, and the subconscious plane of the mind can only use that which has already been stored away in its space. Mind moves along the lines of least resistance and when it becomes necessary for us to think upon a certain subject, we find ourselves taking the easiest line of thought, which's always the line which has been traveled most frequently in the past. It tires us to think along new lines,while to think upon the old accustomed lines requires but little effort, and we consequently move along the lines od least resistance. We have in our subconscious plane of mind many cut-and-dried opinions, many ready-made ideas, upon which we have never seriously thought.
Sometime, in the past, we have accepted these opinions of ideas from some source,and we have never seriously considered the other side of the question. And yet, when any of these subjects come up in conversation, or reading, we find that we have well-settled opinions upon them and are often quite bigoted regarding them. It's only when we are forced to take out the old opinion and idea and examine it carefully and closely,look it over, that we find that there is no merit at all in it, and we are annoyed to think that we have been keeping the old thing around the place so long, and we discard it and replace it with a good sound thought of our own manufacture. A good mental house-cleaning will reveal to us many such useless and imperfect articles around the subconscious storeroom.

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Re: Philosophie...

Post  Admin on Thu 7 Apr - 8:44

Hello everyone! For this week,it will be a short teaching in my concept of the reality… It's from:Simple Nature :Crowell.
Waves:Dandelion.Cello. Read those 2 words, and your brain instantly conjures a stream of associations, the most prominent of which have to do with vibrations. Our mental category of dandelionness is strongly linked to the color of light waves that vibrate about half a million billion times a second:yellow. The velvety throb of a cello has as its most obvious characteristic a relatively low musical pitch, the note you're spontaneously imagining right now might be one whose sound vibrations repeat at a rate of a hundred times a second.
Evolution seems to have designed our 2 most important senses around the assumption that our environment is made of waves, whereas up until now, we've mostly taken the view that Nature can be understood by breaking her down into smaller and smaller parts, ending up with particles as her most fundamental building blocks. Does that work for light and sound? Sound waves are disturbances in air, which is made of atoms, but light, on the other hand,isn't a vibration of atoms. Light, unlike sound, can travel through a vacuum:if you're reading this by sunlight,you're taking advantage of light that had to make it through millions of miles of vacuum to get to you. Waves, then, aren't just a trick that vibrating atoms can do. Waves are one of the basic phenomena of the universe. At the end of this book, we'll even see that the things we've been calling particles, such as electrons,are really waves!
Wave motion:Let's start with an intuition-building exercise that deals with waves in matter, since they're easier than light waves to get your hands on. Put your fingertip in the middle of a cup of water and then remove it suddenly. You'll have noticed 2 results that are surprising to most people. First, the flat surface of the water doesn't simply sink uniformly to fill in the volume vacated by your finger. Instead, ripples spread out, and the process of flattening out occurs over a long period of time, during which the water at the center vibrates above and below the normal water level. This type of wave motion is the topic of the present section.
Second, you've found that the ripples spread out, and the process of flattening out occurs over a long period of time,during which the water at the center vibrates above and below the normal water level. This type of wave motion is the topic of the present section. Second, you've found that the ripples bounce off of the walls of the cup, in much the same way that a ball would bounce off of a wall. In the next section we discuss what happens to waves that have a boundary around them. Until then, we confine ourselves to wave phenomena that can be analyzed as if the medium (the water) was infinite and the same everywhere. It isn't hard to understand why removing your fingertip creates ripples rather than simply allowing the water to sink backdown uniformly. The initial crater ,a/1,left behind by your finger has sloping sides, and the water next to the crater flows downhill to fill in the hole. The water far away, on the other hand, initially has no way of knowing what has happened ,because there's no slope for it to flow down. As the hole fills up, the rising water at the center gains upward momentum, and overshoots,creating a little hill where there had been a hole originally. The area just outside of this region has been robbed of some of its water in order to build the hill, so a depressed « moat » is formed ,a/2. This effect cascades outward,producing ripples.

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Re: Philosophie...

Post  Admin on Wed 13 Apr - 17:00

Hello everyone!For this week,it's a combination of 2 new books then I'd found recently…
1)Simple Nature/Crowell
2)Consciousness and its implications/prof. Daniel N.Robinson.
1)A wave's velocity depends on the medium :
A material object can move with any velocity, and can be sped up slowed down by a force that increases or decreases its kinatic energy. Not so with waves. The speed of a wave,depends on the properties of the medium (and perhaps also on the shape of the wave,for certain types of waves. Sound waves travel at about 340 m/s in air, 1000m/s in helium. If you kick up water waves in a pool,you'll find that kicking harder makes waves that are taller (and therefore) carry more energy),not faster. The sound waves from an exploding stick of dynamite carry a lot of energy, but are no faster than any other waves. In the following section we'll give an example of the physical relationship between the wave speed and the properties of the medium. Once a wave is created,the only reason its speed will change is if enters a different medium or if the properties of the medium change. It's not so suprising that a change in medium can slow down a wave, but the reverse can also happen.
A sound wave traveling through a helium ballon will slow down when it emerges into the air, but if it enters another ballon it will speed back again! Similarly,water waves travel more quickly over deeper water,so a wave will slow down as it passes over an underwater ridge,but speed up again as it emerges into deep water.
2)Zombies:In this course,we'll attempt to unravel the nature of consciousness,its provenance,and its function. We begin with an examination of the concept of the zombie, which functions effectively as a physical entity without consciousness. If a system can solve problems and process information without consciousness,of what value is cpnsciousness? The question of ethics is raised if we consider that entities without consciousness cannot be judged for their actions. Could such an entity strive for moral improvement? The subject of consciousness is vast and varied and , as a philosophical problem, far from an easy solution.
I.Our core questions in this course on consciousness are:what is it? How does it come about? What is it for?
A. Popular speech is rife with references to consciousness. We talk about being « half conscious » or « unconscious » of something; the act of « daydreaming » reflects by contrast on a vividly conscious life; the patient in the emergency room is suffering a « loss of consciousness ».
B. Zombies, the « walking dead », accomplish what they do without consciousness.
1. Philosophical zombies are different from the Hollywood version.
2. They are created to test certain notions we have about the essence of mental life and the properties that life must have to qualify as «  consciously » lived.
C. Some years ago, Güven Güzeldere summarized various ways of configuring such entities and then understanding their nature.
1.One might make a device that's indistinguishable from conscious human beings in the way it behaves, though its internal machinery would be nothing like our own (a behavioral zombie).
2. A better « fit » than the behavioral zombie is the functional zombie, which does and says what we do and say; its underlying systems function as ours do but don't include anything by way of consciousness,let alone self-consciousness.
3. The third kind of zombie, the identical zombie,has an anatomy fully identical with that of a human.
D.These 3 types of zombie capture the various ways philosophers have attempted to dissolve the seeming mystery of consciousness.
1.One solution to the problem of consciousness is behavioristic : x is properly regarded as « conscious » to the extent that its behavior is relevantly like that of anything that's regarded as being conscious.
2. Other philosophers might use more stringent criteria : Not only must there be behavioral similarities of the right sort, but these must come about in the right sort of way.
3.The behavior must express underlying physiological processes of just the sort that underlie our own actions and speech.
4. To the extent that the device functions the way we do,we are permitted to regard it as conscious in the relevant sense.
5.But this entity nontheless has no consciousness as we understand that state:physical foundations are unable to account for the consciousness itself.

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Re: Philosophie...

Post  Admin on Thu 21 Apr - 8:11

Hello everyone!I'm reading the same book of last week : Consciousness and its implications/prof.Daniel N.Robinson… I'd found his courses on this subject very interesting and I wanted to share with you my findings… It should be more considered by « academic people » in our social mentality… It's not in this direction under my view… The Quebec states always favorising the craziness to consciousness…
If the constituents of our own bodies continuously change,can we still retain an identifiable « self »? We again turn to the British empiricist John Locke (1632-1704) for his contribution to the issue.
I.What's the relationship between consciousness and knowledge?
A.It's possible to imagine a zombie called George that responds to his name.
1.What's unimaginable is his knowing himself to be George,because presumably,a zombie doesn't « know » anything. To know something is to be conscious of it and zombies aren't self-conscious.
2.Consequently,they aren't self-conscious.
B.The claim « I'm conscious of a rabbit in the garden » is different from the claim « I know there's a rabbit in the garden. »
C.There's a difference between being conscious of and being conscious.
1.The former is always subject to error.
2.Being conscious or aware is to be the possible subject of an experience,the self.
3. In the older phenomenological literature,there's the common assumption that consciousness invariably includes a « self ».
4.For there to be knowledge,motives, desires,and beliefs,there must be consciousness,but these features of mental life are often in operation without the actor reflecting on all of them.
II.With reflective consciousness,the focus is on self as the subject or source, but who or what is « self »?
A. We could argue that an old ship,Old Faithful, that has been extensively rebuilt,is no longer Old Faithful. Since none of the constituents of our bodies remains constant over time, it might be argued that there's no self as such, for everything about us physically changes from moment to moment.
B.Against all this is a venerable philosophical conception of entities that retain their identity over time and independently of physical changes.
1.On this understanding,a thing is what it's essentially, even if a number of so-called accidental changes are imposed on it.
2. Intellectuals of the 17th century,especially Newton and Galileo, held that the last word or what really matters is to be provided by science.
3.Thomas Hobbes (1588-1679) in his De Corpore of 1642 held that 2 distinguishable entities cannot be the same and that there are continuity of the person throughout the seasons of bodily change,given one condition. Hobbes set the stage for John Locke's analysis of the issue.
1.In his essay concerning human understanding, Locke develops the distinction between « real » and « nominal » essences.
2.What we come to regard as the « essence » of something arises from our own tendency to classify it in a manner that's convenient by our own lights.
3.What will give Locke or anyone else that continuing identity that might have been incorrectly regarded as one's « real essence » is no more than that on which the various habits and dispositions of the mind settle.
4. It's the matter in which human intelligence perceives and uses entities that determines their « nominal essence ».
5. Locke gave the problem of personal identity its modern formulation.
6.Faithful to Newtonian science,Locke regarded the real essence of a thing to be beyond the power of sense, a categories of sub-microscopic particles held together by gravitational forces but perceived in ways that generate such nominal characterizations as « Fellow of the Royal Society » or « a rational animal ».
These characterizations arise from conventional discourse,the contingencies of culture and context, the nuances of perception,memory, and mental life.
8. Locke accepts that there is a real essence,but he rejects the claim that this is given to us in our observations of a thing.

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Re: Philosophie...

Post  Admin on Tue 26 Apr - 9:11

Hello everyone! It's again in the same book for this week,but it's the last one's for a while… Not in my articles but in this book…
Donald Davidson (1917-2003) defended the thesis that he labeled anomalous monism. Davidson's monistic ontlology proposed that there's only one kind of stuff in reality : physical stuff; yet mental life isn't reducible or directly translatable into physicalistic terms and concepts. The « anomaly » is that,on Davidson's account,mental events and processes do bring about physical events in just the sense of strict causation.
To do this,they must be physical but of such a nature as to preclude reduction to the terms of the physical sciences. This is anomalous, for we are required to retain a dualistic vocabulary even as we acknowledge a monistic reality,hence, anomalous monism.
The most obvious criticism of this view is that it permits the very mental properties that make the causal model problematical. If Davidson were wiling to permit mental properties and,at the same time,regard them as irreducible to physical properties, this begs the question : « How did these mental properties and the conventional view that one thing causes another through some sort of causal mechanism that requires identification.
Instead, he took the position that where there is causation,one thing causes another by just causing it! His skepticism regarding « properties » is echoed by other philosophers who have argued that « properties » are simply ensembles of causes. For example,to say that water is a « universal solvent » is to say that it causes things to dissolve.
To answer the question « what's a mental property? » we need to identify mental entities.
The most obvious mental entities are experiences and thoughts. It's not clear how we should convert the experience of perception of an object into a mental property.
In terms of pain,although we can say that an activity in relevant areas of the brain causally brings about a specific mental property,namely,intensity of pain,we still have the problem of accounting for how it's that the experience (sensation) of pain causes a bodily reaction,such as moving our hand away from fire.

But the problem of other minds is surely not merely a linguistic problem.
The problem of other minds may be seen to arise once we attach all our knowledge claims to direct perception. It's an evidentiary problem,in the sense that it becomes « problematical » only when we use the wrong sort of evidence.
If direct perception constitutes the only justification for claiming to know anything,then, in fact, whole realms of what we regard as the « known » become quite obscure. I don't directly perceive such laws as the laws of the internal combustion engine;my belief in them is inferential. If I were a scientist,my belief would be based on the developed conception of the lawfulness of nature itself, namely,that if such laws weren't persistent over time, the very coherence of the cosmos would be dissolved. Little of such abstract reasoning is available at the level of direct perception.
It could be argued,however,that to talk of the « coherence of the cosmos » simply reflects another of our prejudices.
A « coherent cosmos » can arguably be thought of as just one of an infinitely large number of pictures that might be drawn to capture the nature of reality.
This sort of question is at the heart of a contemporary issue within philosophy of science that's usually categorized as « realism versus antirealism. »

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Re: Philosophie...

Post  Admin on Wed 4 May - 10:29

Hello everyone! I chosed another book for this week… It's interesting and true.
Consciousness/William G. Lycan
Suppose a transparent plastic pail of spring water is sitting in the sun. At the micro-level, a vast seething complexity of things are going on : convection currents,frantic breeding of bacteria and other minuscule life forms, and so on. These things in turn require even more franctic activity at the molecular level to sustain them. Now is all this activity not complex enough that, simply by chance, it might realize a human program for a brief period (given suitable correlations between certain micro-events and the requisite input,output,and state-symbols of the program)?And if so,must the functionalist not conclude that the water in the pail briefly constitutes the body of a conscious being,and has enough activity going on within it at the molecular level that,if Hinckfuss is right about the pail of water, the functionalist quickly slips into a panpsychism that does seem obviously absurd;our feeling that pails of water,rocks,and piles of sand aren't conscious cannot be diagnosed away as easily as Block's intuitions were. So it seems the onus is on me either to show that Hinckfuss's case couldn't really occur or to formulate Homunctionalism in such a way as to exclude entities of this sort from the community of sentient beings. Note first that to counterexample Machine Functionalism the pail cannot merely ape the motions that are in fact made by some organism that's functionally organized on the human model, the actual goings on in someone's CNS. It must also make all the input-output counterfactuals true, an unimaginably demanding task. If the pail actually were to do this,I would be inclined to suspect that it did have thoughts and feelings. But I grant that even this is not the real issue. What I would like to say is that any even subjunctive « realization » of a human program by, say, H2O atoms would be fortuitous.
Relative to all normal (and some abnormal) purposes, the motion of atoms through the void is random,and the degree of randomness present at the micro-level,for me, removes any temptation to concede that Hinckfuss's quantity of water is realizing the relevant program in any interesting or useful sense. What's missing'i think,is the idea of functional organization,or organic integrity and autonomy. Notice that Blcok's 2 cases are underdescribed in this respect. On the one hand,we can suppose that the Chinese (say) « realize » the human program entirely fortuitously,just in virtue of going about their everyday jobs, taking coffee breaks, casually conversing about their sex lives,and so on,thereby standing in bare one-one correspondence to some machine program. On the opposite extreme,the Chinese might have been molded by some superhuman intelligence into a gigantic machine, within which individual humans are mere physical cogs that roll down chutes and drop through slots,etc,quite irrespective of their own life-plans or any other mentation. If the latter obtains, or even if the homunculi and the Chinese workers,respectively, are cooperating in a real sense according to a prearranged plan to translate inputs into ultimate outputs,then there's far stronger inclination to grant sentience or at least sapience to the resulting giant organism.

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Re: Philosophie...

Post  Admin on Wed 11 May - 12:49

Hello everyone!For this week,it's a new book then I'd found… Knowledge nad its limits/Timothy Williams :
Factive mental states : The idea that belief is conceptually prior to knowledge has another source : the internalist conception of mind,and world external to mind,as 2 independent variables. Belief is simply a function of the mind variable. Truth is simply a function of the external world variable,at least when the given proposition is about the external world variable,at least when the given proposition is about the exterbal world variable,at least when the given proposition is about the external world. For the internalist, knowledge is a function of the 2 variables, not of either one alone;whether one knows that it's raining doesn't depend solely or one's mental state,a state which's the same for those who perceive the rain and those who hallucinate it, but it also doesn't depend solely on the state of the weather ,a state which's the same for those who believe the appearances and those who doubt them. The internalist therefore conceives knowledge as a complex hybrid crying out for analysis into it's internal and external components,of which belief and truth respectively are the most salient. The analysis is expected on general metaphysical grounds. Recent developments in the philosophy of mind have called the metaphysics of internalism into question by indicating ways in which the content of a mental state can constituvely depend on the environment. I believe that tigers growl; an exact physical replica of me lacks that belief if his contact has been not with tigers but with schmigers,beasts of a similar appearance belonging to a different species; his belief is that schmigers growl. Some internalists conclude that not even belief as attributed in ordinary langage is simply a function of mind,and try in theory to isolate a core of purely mental states. Such attempts haven't succeeded.Rather,we may conceive mind and external world as dependent variables, and reject the metaphysics that led us to expect analysis into purely internal and purely external components. On this view,belief as attributed in ordinary langage is a genuine mental state constitutively dependent on the external world.
If the content of a mental state can depend on the external world, so can the attribute to that content. Knowledge is one such attitude. One's knowledge that it's raining depends on the weather; it doesn't follow that knowing that it's raining isn't a mental state. The natural assumption is that sentences of the form « S knows p » attribute mental states just as sentences of the forms « S believes p » and « S desires p » do.
What's at stake is much more than whether we apply the word « mental » to knowing. If we could isolate a core of states which constituted « pure mind » by being mental in some more thorough going way than knowing is, then the term « mental » might be extended to knowing as a mere courtesy title. On the conception defended here, there's no such core of mental states exclusive of knowing. If we want to illustrate the nature of mentality,knowing is as good an example as believing. The philosophy of mind cannot afford to neglect knowing,for that state is part of its core subject matter. For similar reasons,other truth-entailing attitudes such as perceiving and remembering that something is the case may also be classified as mental states. Knowing can be understood as the most general of such truth-entailing mental states. Sceptics and their fellow-travellers characteristically suppose that the truth-values of one's beliefs can vary independently of those beliefs and of all one's other mental states : one's total mental state is exactly the same in a sufficiently radical sceptical scenario as it's in a common-sense scenario,yet most of one's beliefs about the external world are true in the common-sense scenario and false in the sceptical scenario. But if knowing is itself a mental state,that supposition is tantamount to the sceptical conclusion that in the common-sense scenario one's beliefs don't constitute knowledge, even though they're true. For, since false beliefs never constitute knowledge,one certainly doesn't know in the sceptical scenario;the supposition that one's in exactly the same mental state in the 2 scenarios therefore implies that one doesn't know in the common-sense scenario either, given that knowing makes a difference to one's total mental state.The anti-sceptic shouldn't accept the supposition. Any mental life in the sceptical scenario is of a radically impoverished kind. Of course it doesn't feel impoverished « from the inside »,but that failure of self-knowledge is part of the impoverishment.

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Re: Philosophie...

Post  Admin on Wed 18 May - 8:53

For this week it will be another section of the book Knowledge and its limits by Timothy Williams explainiong the concept of belief vs knowledge and the intrinsic link between them…
Knowledge as the justification of belief and assertion. (We could apply this section to the muslim world and what happens all around the world in this degree…)
The idea that belief is conceptually prior to knowledge easily leads to the idea that evidence and justification are conceptually prior to knowledge too. Although that's most vivid in the traditional definition of knowledge as justified true belief,Gettier's counterexamples to that definition didn't remove the idea that the concept of justification or evidence would occur with the concept of belief in a more complex analysis of the concept of knowledge. Consequently,the concept of knowledge was assumed to be unavailable for use in an elucidation of the concept of justification or evidence,on pain of circularity. Once we cease to assume that belief is conceptually prior to knowledge ,we can experiment with using the concept of knowledge to elucidate the concepts of justification and evidence. It argues that one's total evidence is simply one's total knowledge. Thus a hypothesis is inconsistent with the evidence if and only if it's inconsistent with known truths ,it's a good explanation of the evidence if and only if it's a good explanation of known truths. One's evidence justifies belief in the hypothesis if and only if one's knowledge justifies that belief. Knowledge figures in the account primarily as what justifies, not as what gets justified. Knowledge can justify a belief which's not itself knowledge, for the justification relation isn't deductive. For example, I may be justified in believing that someone is a murderer by knowing that he emerged stealthily with a bloody knife from the room in which the body was subsequently discovered,even if he's in fact innocent and I therefore don't know that he's a murderer. The equation of one's evidence with one's knowledge doesn't imply any particular theory of how a given body of propositional evidence justifies a given belief.
Rather,it connects absolute and relative justification. A belief is justified relative to some other beliefs from which it has been derived in some appropriate way (perhaps by deduction), but it's not justified absolutely unless those beliefs are justified absolutely. Where does the regress end? On the assumption that it ends at evidence, the equation of evidence with knowledge implies that one's belief is justified absolutely if and only if it's justified relative to one's knowledge. The regress of justification ends at knowledge. The account might be thought to make all knowledge self-justifying in an absurdly trivial way:one's knowledge is justified absolutely if and only if it's justified relative to itself. This objection would be fair if the point of justification were to serve at its best as a condition for knowledge. But on the present account that isn't the point of justification. Rather,justification is primarily a status which knowledge can confer on beliefs that look good in its light without themselves amounting to knowledge . Knowledge itself enjoys rhe status of justification only as a limiting case, just as,trivially,every shade of green counts as similar to a shade of green.
It's my advice for the muslims…. Thank you to know!

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Re: Philosophie...

Post  Admin on Thu 26 May - 9:02

Hello everyone!For this week,it's a useful thinking book than I'd found very interesteing… Rational choice and judgment:Decision analysis for the Decider/Rex Brown.
Improving Decisions:Much of the time,we feel comfortable about the option we end up choosing in a given decision. However,we sometimes worry that we could have better integrated what we know and what we want and thus given ourselves a better chance of meeting our goals. Even when we know what to do, we may have trouble communicating our reasoning to others, whose perspectives may differ.
The problem:Muddled thinking,or at least the lack of responsible reflection,is widespread in private and professionnal circles and may cause serious,but avoidable,harm. For example,thoughtless or passive citizens may be led to support legislation promoted by special interests (trade restriction?tax relief?). Regulatory officials may ban or permit,health practices without trading off risks and costs responsibly.

Rationality is no substitute for knowledge :
A sound decision depends both on how good the knowledge you use is and on how well you reason from that knowledge. Here,we focus mainly on the second,although it's important to recognize that the first can be at least as important. If you are deciding whether to accept an unfamiliar roomate,you may want to take more trouble finding out more about his/her background than pondering what you already know about it. People often mistakenly assume that my knowing something about rationality puts me instantly in a position to give a superior prescription on what to do,when I have only the sketchiest knowledge of the problem,usually less than they have. « Barbage in-garbage out ». Rationality may help to avoid putting garbage in the middle,but it's no substitute for « better garbage ».

Evolution of decision analysis:Before the 20th century,major scientific advances oriented toward decision making had tended to be descriptive more than prescriptive,focusing on how the world works rather than how to make it work better. Decision circumstances changed slowly from year to year,so that decision practice could take its time to improve by trial and error. By the beginning of the 20th century,however, technology and other fields had begun to change rapidly. The life and death perils of poor decisions in World War II spurred the development of the quantitative decision tools of OR (operations research). They were special-purpose tools (for locating enemy submarines) that may well have been decisive in winning the war. After the war, or was adapted to industry,with some success in certain situations. These tended to be where options were complex and consequences were clearly defined and involved processes that could be modeled mathematically (such as in production scheduling and transportation logistics). Progress in applying quantitative methods to choices involving a few clear-cut options with messy outcomes was a good deal slower. Analysis here completed less effectively with unaided humans,and deciders often did better by backing their own judgment.

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Re: Philosophie...

Post  Admin on Wed 1 Jun - 12:39

Hello everyone! I chosed a new boook of thoughts this week… It's short but simple to understand…
A physician to the soul/Horatio W.Dresser Ph.D. :
Some occupations are thrust upon us, others are acquired by dint of hard work;the vocation of physician to the soul is a gift of experience. It may indeed be acquired,but is more likely to be added to a man's regular work, not because he directly sought it but incidentally. One thinks of every minister or father-confessor as such a friend to the soul,but such friendship isn't limited to the ministry, and the priest is sometimes a mere agent of a doctrinal system. Some problems are taken rather to the lawyer,though not always with ideal results. The regular physician may also be a friend indeed,so may the teacher,the employer, or the kinsman. By a subtle intuition people know whom to trust. Hence a man unexpectedly finds himself sought by people of certain types who rear him, as it were,into their special friend. The revelations of which he's the recipient enable him to discern the deeper meanings of life, and to develop new fields of interest.
After a time there are results to publish to the world,and one friend to the soul is able to further the work of others.It's with the hope that some results thus attained may be of service that in what follows I shall collect certain hints, and undertake to define this ideal occupation with reference to the soul's needs at the present time. First a word to indicate how the ideal vocation is added to professional work. As the development of such an office is obvious in the case of clergyman or physician , we may take the work of the teacher of philosophy as typical. Now, philosophy of all subjects is deemed most remote from individual problems, given over to tradition and the dry routine of abstract questions. He whose vocation compels him to draw distinctions until only the technically trained can follow,is supposed to be unable to render a decision in an indivicual case.Moreover,it's the philosopher's province to raise objections to the last, and he of all men is able to block conviction and impede conduct. But this depends upon the use to which this hair-splitting occupation is put, for it may well lead to the finest discernment of which the human mind is capable.
The inquirer would indeed be less likely to consult a philosopher if he expected the sort of positive statement which the clergyman ordinarily gives. Yet the minister is oftentimes noncommital where the philosopher is unsparingly frank.
Hence those who are deeply involved in doubt, and those who seek fundamental self-knowledge, are likely to turn to the teacher of philosophy. At any rate,it's the province of philosophy to make explicit the interests of the occupation which ministers and teachers share. The philosopher is in large measure the freest member of the community,since his interest is eternal truth,and isn't dependent on particular systems. The work of the soul's physician explicitly lies in the universal realm which exists above all special doctrines.

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Re: Philosophie...

Post  Admin on Tue 21 Jun - 10:15

Hello everyone!For this week again,it will be the continuity of the last one's. It's really how I feel in the daily life and the truth about me and my thinking…
If the anger actually finds expression in an unkind act,the effects are even more painfully apparent.Moreover,the complications may be very great.
The victim may be zealous Christian,one who eagerly prays to be righteou. Yet there may be uncontrolled forces which rise on occasion and sweep evry righteous sentiment out of mind. Hence there's warfare between the gentle and the fierce emotions,and the entire state of bodily health may be involved. The problem may be to understand and to master the tendencies which make for anger so that a christian spirit shall prevail. Thus one subject leads to another until one finds that the problem of the emotions and their control is the problem of life.
More prolific than anger are the emotions of fear. Many people spend a life of servitude to fear. They are constantly in dread of disease of various sorts,and the slightest pain suggests a fear. They almost create what they dread by habitually dwelling upon it,by exercising their ingenuity to the last degree in anticipation of the ills which may befall them. When they step out into the street,enter an electric car or a railway train,more fears are set free,and the pleasure of the journey is sadly marred by these ravaging emotions. Other fears override these ravaging emotions. Other fears override thse when the destination is reached,and the slightest variation from the expected,whether on land or sea, in the house or out of it,is an invitation to yet other fears to arise.
As if the fear of accident and disease weren't enough there's oftentimes added a round of fears in regard to property, investments,jewelry,the silver that has been put away, the money that may not arrive. Added to all these fears is solicitude for our friends and families,supplemented by the ever-present fear of death. Luckily for us nature is able to throw off many of the results of all this folly. But simply to trace the effect of fear in our lives should suffice to show that we are constantly affected by baneful influences. Many of these mental states pass off or remain merely mental. But in general, any state that affects us emotionnaly is accompanied by a physical disturbance, and through the nervous reaction the emotion may become a serious cause of trouble. Where fear doesn't actually create its object it may at least simulate it, as when the dread of having teeth extracted arouses anticipatory pains. A fear is an invatation. If we could observe it as one might an animal we should see it stealing upon its prey. When we fear,we thus far put ourselves at the mercy of that which we fear. The man who's habitually beset by fear is even in a state of unstable equilibrium.

A part of one's attitude towards life may express itself through habitual fear concerning the future. Here's a woman,for instance, who's at the head of a flourishing school which might at any time be sold for a sum sufficient to maintain her for the rest of life. But, possessed of inordinate fear lest the future find her penniless,she hires thousands of dollars to invest in an enterprise which she believes will yield a large profit. But the enterprise is controlled by a trust, and the methods of the trust wouldn't bear investigation. Thus questions of conscience arise and the mind has no peace. Added to this is the restless anxiety with which the reports of the stock market are consulted from day to day. In conflict with all this is a christian belief that one ought to trust,never take anxious thought for the morrow. Furthermore there are social attitudes that comport neither with this christian sentiment nor with the unceasing distrust over financial matters. The situation is in fact complicated almost beyond description.

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Re: Philosophie...

Post  Admin on Wed 29 Jun - 9:19

For this week,I chosed an extract from Jean-Jacques Rousseau,it's a true message over the muslim world and the facts about them… A Discourse upon the origin and the foundation of the inequality among mankind.
The body being the only instrument that savage man is acquainted with,he employs it to different uses,of which ours,for want of practice,are incapable of;and we may thank our industry for the loss of that strength and agility,which necessity obliges him to acquire. Had he hatchet,would his hand so easily snap off from an oak so stout a branch?Had he a sling,would it dart a stone to so great a distance? Had he a ladder,would he run so nimbly up a tree? Had he a horse,would,he with such swiftness shoot along the plain? Give civilized man but time to gather about him all his machines,and no doubt he'll be an overmatch for the savage:but if you have a mind to see a contest still more unequal,place them naked and unarmed one opposite to the other;and you'll soon discover the advantage there's in perpetually having all our forces at our disposal,in being constantly prepared against all events, and in always carrying ourselves,as it were,whole and entire about us. Hobbes would have it that man is naturally void of fear,and always intent upon attacking and fighting. An illustrious philosopher thinks on the contrary,and Cumberland and Puffendorff likewise affirm it,that nothing is more fearful than man in a state of nature,that he's always in tremble,and ready to fly at the first motion he perceives,at the first noise that strikes his ears. This, indeed,may be very true in regard to objects with which he's not acquainted;and I make no doubt of his being terrified at every new sight that presents itself, as often as he cannot distinguish the physical good and evil which he may expect from it,nor compare his forces and the dangers he has to encounter;circumstances that seldom occur in a state of nature, where all things proceed in so uniform a manner, and the face of the earth isn't liable to those sudden and continual changes occasioned in it by the passions and inconstancies of collected bodies. But savage man living among other animals without any society or fixed habitation,and finding himself early under a necessity of measuring his strength with theirs,soon makes a comparison between both, and finding that he surpasses them more in address,than they surpass him in strength, he learns not to be any longer dread of them. Turn out a bear or a wolf against a sturdy,active,resolute savage, (and this they all are),provided with stones and a good stick; and you'll soon find that the danger is at least equal on both sides,and that after several trials of this kind,wild beasts,who aren't fond of attacking each other,will not be very fond of attacking man, whom they have found every whit as wild as themselves. As to animals who have really more strength than man has address,he's, in regard to them,what other weaker species are,who find means to sunsist notwithstanding;he has even this great advantage over such weaker species,that being equally fleet with them, and finding on every tree an almost inviolable asylum,he's always at liberty to take it or leave it,as he likes best,and of course to fight or to fly,whichever is most agreeable to him. To this we may add that no animal naturally makes war upon man,except in the case of self-defence or extreme hunger;nor ever expresses against him any of these violent antipathies,which seem to indicate that some particular species are intended by nature for the food of others.

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Re: Philosophie...

Post  Admin on Wed 6 Jul - 8:58

Hello everyone!For this week'I continue with Rousseau and the comparison between savages and civilized men…
Nature speaks to all animals,and beasts obey her voice. Man feels the same impression,but he at the same time perceives that he's free to resist or to acquiesce;and it's in the consciousness of this liberty, that the spirituality of his soul chiefly appears : for natural philosophy explains, in some measure, the mechanism of the senses and the formation of ideas; but in the power of willing,or rather of choosing, and in the consciousness of this power, nothing can be discovered but acts, that are purely spiritual, and cannot be accounted for by the laws of mechanics. But though the difficulties,in which all these questions are involved, should leave some room to dispute on this difference between man and beast, there's another very specific quality that distinguishes them, and a qualitywhich will admit of no dispute; this is the faculty of improvement; a faculty which, as circumstances offer, successively unfolds all the other faculties, and resides among us not only in the species, but in the individuals that compose it;whereas a beast is,at the end of some months, all he ever will be during the rest of his life; and his species,at the end of a thousand years, precisely what it was the first year of that long period. Why is man alone subject to dotage? Is it not,because he thus returns to his primitive condition? And because, while the beast, which has acquired nothing and has likewise nothing to lose,continues always in possession of his instinct, man, losing by old age, or by accident, all the acquisitions he had made in consequence of his perfectibility, thus falls back even lower than beasts themselves? It would be a melancholy necessity for us to be obliged to allow, that this distinctive and almost unlimited faculty is the source of all man's misfortunes; that it's this faculty, which, though by slow degrees, draws them out of their original condition, in which his days would slide away insensibly in peace and innocence;that it's this faculty, which, in a succession of ages, produces his discoveries and mistakes, his virtues and his vices, and, at long run, renders him both his own and nature's tyrant. It would be shocking to be obliged to commend, as a beneficient being, whoever he was that first suggested to the Oronoco Indians the use of those boards which they bind on the temples of their children, and which secure to them the enjoyment of some part at least of their natural imbecility and happiness.
Savage man, abandoned by nature to pure instinct, or rather indemnified for that which has perhaps been denied to him by faculties capable of immediately supplying the place of it, and of raising him afterwards a great deal higher, would therefore begin with functions that were merely animal:to see and to feel would be his first condition, which he would enjoy in common with other animals. To will and not to will, to wish and to fear, would be the first, and in a manner,the only operations of his soul, till new circumstances occasioned new developments.
Let moralists say what they will,the human understanding is greatly indebted to the passions, which, on their side, are likewise universally allowed to be greatly indebted to the human understanding. It's by the activity of our passions,that our reason improves: we covet knowledge merely because we covet enjoyment, and it's impossible to conceive why a man excempt from fears and desires should take trouble to reason. The passions, in their turn,owe their origin to our wants, and their increase to our progress in science; for we cannot desire or fear anything, but in consequence of the ideas we have of it, or of the simple impulses of nature; and savage man, destitute of every speciesof knowledge, experiences no passions but those of this last kind; his desires never extend beyond his physical wants; he knows no goods but food, a female, and rest;he fears no evil but pain, and hunger; I say pain, and not death; for no animal,merely as such, will ever know what it's to die,and the knowledge,of death, and of its terrors, is one of the first acquisitions made by man, in consequence of his deviating from the animal state. I could easily, were it requisite, cite facts in support of this opinion, and show, that the progress of the mind has everywhere kept pace exactly with the wants, to which nature had left the inhabitants exposed, or to which circumstances had subjected them, and consequently to the passions, which inclined them to provide for these wants.

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Re: Philosophie...

Post  Admin on Tue 12 Jul - 13:29

Hello everyone! For this week,it will be 2 books,the first is the continuity on=f the last one's on Jean-Jacques Rousseau and the origins and the foundation of inequalities of mankind and the second is:Brains and Realities of Jay Alfred (one of my favorite authors)…
1)At first they gave every object a peculiar name, without any regard to its genus or species, things which these first institutors of langage were in no condition to distinguish; and every individual presented itself solitary to their minds, as it stands in the table of nature. If they called one oak A, they called abother oak B : so that their dictionary must have been more extensive in proportion as their knowledge of things was more confined. It could not but be a very difficult task to get rid of so diffuse and embarrassing a nomenclature; as in order to marshal the several beings under common and generic denominations,it was necessary to be first acquainted with their properties, and their differences; to be stocked with observations and definitions,that's to say, to understand natural history and metaphysics,advantages which the men of these times couldn't have enjoyed. Besides, general ideas cannot be conveyed to the mind without the assistance of words, nor can the understanding seize them without the assistance of propositions. This is one of the reasons,why mere animals cannot form such ideas, nor ever acquire the perfectibility which depends on such an operation. When a monkey leaves without the least hesitation one nut for another, are we to think he has any general idea of that kind of fruit, and that he compares these 2 individual bodies with his archetype notion of them?

I stop at these first advances,and beseech my judges to suspend their lecture a little, in order to consider,what a great way langage has still to go in, in regard to the invention of physical substantive alone, (though the easiest part of langage to invent), to be able to express all the sentiments of man, to assume an invariable form, to bear being spoken in public and to influence society:I earnestly entreat them to consider how much time and knowledge must have been requisite to find out numbers,abstract words, the aorists ,and all the other tenses of verbs, the particles,and syntax,the method of connecting propositions and arguments, of forming all the logic of discourse. For my own part, I'm so scared at the difficulties that multiply at every step, and so convinced of the almost demonstrated impossibility of langages owing their birth and establishment to means that were merely human, that I must leave to whoever may please to take it up, the task of discussing problem. « Which was the most necessary, society already formed to invent langages, or langages already invented to form society? »
But be the case of these origins ever so mysterious, we may at least infer from the little case which nature has taken to bring men together by mutual wants,and make the use of speech easy to them, how little she has done towards making them sociable,and how little she has contributed to anything which they themselves have done to become so.

2)According to David Bohm,it's not the universe that splits, but it's just awareness as a whole that divides into many parts that aren't aware of each other. « We repeat again what squires has said, it's not a theory of many universes, but a theory of many viewpoints of one universe. Everett's aim isn't mainly to explain the universe, but to explain our perceptions of the universe. Everett's theory relates the universe to various points of view that are contained within it. Everett didn't contemplate the splitting of the universe. There's no mention of splitting universes in Everett's work. Indeed Everett's view shouldn't even be called the many-worlds interpretation but rather, as Albert and Loewer have suggested the « Many-Minds » interpretation. The many-minds interpretation assumes that physical reality corresponds to the total wave function of the universe.
According to David Bohm, implicit in Everett's interpretation is that each person has a total mind that can split into many sub-minds that aren't aware of each other. Each mind can be aware of a particular brain state corresponding to a memory of a particular experimental result that's stable and distinct from other memories corresponding to different results of the experiment.
If the mind were in the domain of quantum mechanics,the wave function would be in a linear superposition. Everett then assumes a random process in which the original mind splits into 2 distinct minds each observing a mirror image of the other's experimental result. When one mind each observing a mirror image of the other's experimental result. When one mind observes plus 1 the other mind observes minus 1. The observations are correlated and its sum is zero. Thus Everett replaces the random collapsing of the wave function by the random partitioning of the total mind.
What would happen if a person is able to integrate his many partial minds?Perhaps advanced meditation techniques allow this to happen. Will his many (partial, anti-correlated) minds cancel out to a void? We'll attempt to answer this question in the next few chapters.

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Re: Philosophie...

Post  Admin on Tue 19 Jul - 9:11

Hello everyone!For this week again,it will be very simple,I'd found an interesting part in Brains and Realities… It's a good explanation of the different perceptions of the same reality by different minds…
Complementary attributes and Universes; and the brain :
It's a scientific fact that each elementary particle has a complementary opposite, a special partner called its antiparticle that has the same mass but the opposite electric charge. According to Richard Feynman, anti-particles can also be considered as particles moving backward in time,in other words,in reversed time. It has also been found that this universe favors left-handed particles. In supersymmetry theories,matter-particles (fermions) are reflected as force-particles (bosons) and vice-versa. Objects comprising these reflected particles are invisible to us. There's abundant evidence that the multiverse appears to our brains to be composed of a pletora of pairs of particles and universes with complementary attributes.
Contrafactual universes exist and stabilize each other under David Deutsche's many-worlds interpretation of quantum physics. Yet why do we not experience contrafactual universes at the same time? Why do we live in a matter-dominated left-handed classical universe? According to Fred Alan Wolf, it's impossible in any single universe for an object to exhibit 2 or more contrafactual attributes at the same time. A coin showing heads and tails simultaneously would be a coin showing one side up in one universe and the other down in another universe. Each universe is the confluence of agreements concerning what's logically consistent.
Perhaps our serial mode of perception confines us to a 3d universe which is blocked-off from other contrafactual universes. Nevertheless, these are complementary pairs of interlocking attributes that can be processed by our brains as a whole, for example the edge and the surface of an object can be processed in parallel streams and then synthetize to present one object to consciousness; while for other complementary pairs, one attribute is suppressed. Whether the rejected complementary attribute is immediately conscious,becomes conscious later (hence,generating perceptual cycles) or is left in the unconscious, depends on the degree of dissonance between the attributes in the complementary pair.
We cannot see matter with reverse parity ( the so-called mirror matter); we also cannot hope to see antimatter objects because they will be mysteriously and conveniently annihilated by matter objects. Our physical brains also cannot see very high energy objects. Compared to our physical sensory systems, scientific instruments can go somewhat further in what they can measure and observe. But they too have their limitations. We see that when an experiment is set up in one way, electrons appear as waves; when the context of the experiment is changed, they appear as particles,much like how our brains operate.
Serial-linear operation of conscious left brain :
According to psychologists, we know only a single coherent event in each moment, a visual scene, a mental image or a fleeting thought. We cannot do 2 things consciously at the same time, such as carrying on an intense conversation and driving in busy traffic. However you can switch attention from one activity to another rapidly, so that it appears that you are conscious of more than one activity. When one activity becomes conscious,the other activity recedes to the background and is operated in an unconscious mode, again analogous to foreground-background switching, with the conscious left brain in the foreground and the unconscious right brain in the background during most of the day.
However, it's proposed that if subjects in an experiment relaxed their gaze and/or attention (when the brain makes only weak measurements of the environment), it may be possible to maintain an awareness of 2 different images or activities. It's only when attention is focused strongly on one activity or part (when the brain makes strong measurements of the environment) that the other activity or part recedes to the background.

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Re: Philosophie...

Post  Admin on Wed 27 Jul - 10:30

For tis week,it will be very simple… It’s 2 parts in Brains and Realities of Jay Alfred.
Appearances and Reality :
A stick in the water may look broken but we know from scientific analysis that isn’t broken and that this illusion is caused by refracting light. The appearance is of a broken stick but the reality is that it’s continuous. According to physicist Gary Zukau,our experience tells that the physical world is solid,real, and independent of us. Quantum mechanics says, simply,that this isn’t so,it’s a superposition of waves. In other worlds, the world cannot be as it appears. What we perceive to be physical reality is actually our cognitive supression of the symmetric void suppressions by the brain of one attribute of a complementary pair of attributes due to cognitive dissonance in the brain.
Symmetry in the void breaks down in a cascade due to this continuous supression. The world that emerges from the cognitive suppression may appear to be substantive, but it’s not. If dissonance reduces, however (for example by adopting a non-critical receptive right-brain approach),the suppresion eases and symmetry is restored. Our illusory consciousness of this or that object then vanishes.
« All knowledge is metaphorical; even our most basic sensory perceptions of the world around us can be thought of as an explanatory story created by the brain. »
Andrew Newberg and Eugene D’Aquili.

In split-brain operations,the left brain could also be considered cut-off or deafferented from the right brain, and vice-versa. Alternatively, there are drugs that can suppress the functions of one of the hemispheres. Thirdly, it has also been found that one hemisphere can be prevented from knowing what’s occurring in the opposite hemispherevia the inhibitory actions of the frontal lobes, which houses the attention association area. The effects of deafferention of the orientation association area include a softening of the boundaries of the self. In a sense,this implies that the self arises as a by-product of spatial and temporal perceptions because this area of the brain generates the spacetime matrix in which we live. More specifically, when inputs to the orientation association area are interrupted,it has to work with whatever inputs it has and its internal logic, thus experiencing infinite space and time,according to Newberg and d’Aquili. The intensity of the experience depends upon the degree of the neural blockage, so there’s a spectrum of unitary states that can be experienced. This continuum of experiences links the most profound mystical states to the mundane states in daily life. The total shutdown of neural input would have a dramatic effect on both the left and right brains. The right brain’s orientation area, which’s responsible for creating the neurological matrix we experience as physical space, would lack the information it needs to create the spatial context in which the self can be oriented. In this state of deafferention of the orientation area,the mind would perceive a neurological reality consistent with many mystical descriptions of the ultimate spiritual union : there would be no discrete objects or beings, no sense of space of the passage of time,no line between the self and the rest of the universe. The mind would exist without (the concept of an) ego in a pure state of indifferentiated awareness,a void consciousness, the ultimate unitary state, according to Newberg and d’Aquili.
« If the doors of perception were cleansed every thing would appear to man as it’s, infinite. »
William Blake
Perhaps we should say,If the doors of (sensory) perception were completely shut (deafferented) every thing would appear to man as it’s infinite.

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Re: Philosophie...

Post  Admin on Wed 3 Aug - 9:44

Hello everyone,for this week,I chosed a new book:Ethics without principles/Jonathan Dancy.
When I talk in this book about reasons for action, I mean to be talking of what I call contributory reasons. A contributory reason for action is a feature whose presence makes something of a case for acting,but in such a way that the overall case for doing that action can be improved or strengthened by the addition of a second similar rôle.Also, a contributory reason on one side isn’t necessarily destroyed by the presence of a reason on the other side. This does happen sometimes, I agree, but it’s far from the standard case.
Contributory reasons are oficially reasons capable of doing what they do either alone or in combination with others. But they can combine in peculiar and irregular ways,as we’ll see. There’s no guarantee that the case for doing an action,alreasy made some extent by the presence of one reason, will be improved are like rats, at least to the extent that 2 rats that are supposedly on the same side may in fact turn and fight among themselves addition of the second reason may make things worse rather than better.
Remember the joke about a New York restaurant there are 2 things wrong with this restaurant, the food is terrible and the portions are too small.
Much of our talk of reasons is about contributory reasons in this sense, reasons on one side or on the other, reasons that stack back up with others to make a better or worse case for an action. But as well as talking about reasons in this way, we also speak of what there’s overall reason to do. Thre’s nothing wrong with that, of course, but it shouldn’t delude us into thinking that there are such things as overall reasons to addition to the contributory ones. To talk of what there’s overall reason to do (and rate that reason in this phrase isn’t a count noun) is to talk about where the contributory reasons come down, on this side or on that. We can say we have more reason to do this than to do that, on pain of changing the very situation on which they pass verdict. So there are no overall reasons. All reasons,then,are contributory , unless we can find a further sort of reason that’s neither contributory nor overall. (Which may not be so hard; we might think that there are such things as decisive reasons,which are neither verdictive, since they don’t pass verdict on other reasons, nor contributory, since they would be destroyed (as decisive,at least) by the presence of an opposing decisive reason). The point that verdictive judgements don’t contribute to the situations on which they pass judgement is only one application of the more general truth that thin concepts cannot be used to add to the store of reasons.
That an action is good,or right,is merely to express a judgement about the way in which other considerations go to determine how we should act. At least,this is true if we identify these thin judgements with judgements about overall reason. We might follow Thomas Scanlon and earlier intuitionists before him such as Ewing in identifying the judgement that an act is good with the judgement that it has features that give us overall reason to admire,respect, imitate it,etc. We might follow Stratton-Lake in identifying the judgement that an act is right with the judgement that it has features that give us overall reason to do it, to approve of it, and so on. But even if we do accept these « buck-passing » accounts of the thin properties,and suppose instead that the relevant judgements about what we have overall reason to do are consequences of the thin judgements about rightness and goodness,we’ll get the same result. It will be the features that make the action good or right that stand as the reasons for doing it, approving it, or whatever. That it’s good or right will not add to those reasons. The action’s being good or right merely passes on whatever normative pressure is coming from below,without increasing that pressure. In this respect the thin properties differ from the thick ones. Thre’s some temptation to think that the relation between thick and thin is similar to the relation between the thick and whateverlies below it; but whatever the similarities, there will be this difference : that the applicability of a thick concept is capable of altering,or adding to, the reasons thrown up from below.

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Re: Philosophie...

Post  Admin on Wed 10 Aug - 8:46

Hello everyone! For this week,it’s the continuity of the last one’s… In the encyclopedia of knowledge and management/David G.Schwartz :
The first and most common suggestion about the relation between contributory reasons and oughts is that to be a contributory reason is to be a consideration that would decide the issue (ground an overall ought) if it were the only relevant consideration. My own favourite version of this idea is in Ross,who wrote :
« I suggest prima facie duty or conditional duty as a brief way of referring to the characteristic (quite distinct from that being a duty proper) which an act has, in virtue of being of a certain kind (the keeping of a promise), ob being an act which would be a duty proper if it were not at the same time of another kind which is morally significant. »
We can think of this as a functional definition or characterization of the rôle played by a reason : the characterization runs by appeal to something that such a thing would do in a crtain circumstance. And this is supposed not just to get it right about which things are reasons and which aren’t, but to capture what’s going on when a consideration isn’t alone, or is defeated, but still making a contribution of the style that we trying to understand. Now there can be no objection to functional definitions of this sort, I think, but there can be objections to instances ,and there are to this one. I have 3 objections, in what I think of as increasing strength. The first is that the supposed definition makes essential appeal to the very concept it’s trying to explicate. It does this because of the presence of the word significant at the end, for this sort of significance is exactly what we are trying to understand,and the account appeals to that concept in a way that certainly looks viciously circular. It would be just the same if Ross had spoken of what is morally relevant; what we are trying to understand is what it’s to be to how to act, in the sort of way that a contributory reason is. So an answer which makes essential use of any such notion doesn’t seem able to advance us very far.
My understanding of functional explanations,however,isn’t good enough to tell me whether this first objection is really important. Perhaps we should be thinking of Ross’s definition as non-explicit; we could understand him as saying something like this : « To say that an act is a prima facie duty is to say that,in virtue of being of a certain kind, it’s an act which would be a duty proper if it had no other property that functions in this same sort of way. » This gives no explicit account of the sort of way at issue, but still one might feel that something has been achieved. So I pass to my second objection. This is that the definition is trying to characterize something that a feature can do in concert with others by appeal to something that can only be done in isolation, and this is a peculiar procedure.

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Re: Philosophie...

Post  Admin on Tue 16 Aug - 10:30

Hello everyone!For this week,it’s the continuity of the last wekk,in this sense,it should be a good lesson for muslims and others of this kind… Ethics and Principles/Jonathan Dancy.
My next suggestion is that a contributory reason is a consideration that ought to motivate one. This suggestion has an interesting structure. The ought involved is of course an overall ought, as it needs to be if we are to make any progress at all. The notion of motivation involved, however, is in a sense contributory; for it allows that there may be contrary motivations,only one of which can win. Motivate here isn’t the success-term which means incline to act. This affects the way in which previous arguments apply to the present suggestion. There is no isolation test involved, but might there be an appeal to the comparative idea that with this reason one ought to be more motivated than one would be without it? I think any such appeal would be optional. So far,then, we are in good shape. The main new difficulty that I see is that it’s hard to believe that the structure of motivation should match the profile of reasons in the ways suggested. It’s not as if for every reason one ought to have a little bit of motivation (whatever that might mean); am I somehow in the wrong if I’m not motivated at all by a reason which I’m well aware is defeated in the present case? In similar vein, one could ask whether one’s overall motivation to do the action ought somehow to match the extent to which the reasons for doing it are stronger than the reasons against, or the reasons for doing something else. The answer to this question seems to me be no. A somewhat similar idea is that a reason is a consideration that ought to affect how one deliberates. The main defect of this suggestion is that it attempts to understand a reason for action by identifying it with a reason for deliberating in one way than another, and this seems to subvert the focus ofthe reason. The reason, we might say,is trying to get us to act in the way it wants; it would not be satisfied if we told it that we had fully recognized it by deliberating in the way it told us to. (Apologies for the anthropomorphism here). Admittedly,the proposal at issue isn’t that a reason for action is a reason for deliberating in a certain way, but that it’s a consideration that ought to affect how one deliberates, and again this ought needs to be an overall ought,for otherwise we are merely using the notion of a contributory reason to explain itself. But even so the focus of the reason still seems to be subverted. A second problem is that there may be reasons (even overall reason) to deliberate in a certain way that aren’t matched by reasons for action. For instance, suppose that there is a feature that’s very commonly a reason but isn’t a reason in the present case. We should,perhaps, bear the presence of this feature in mind when deliberating, here as elsewhere,but only so as to determine whether it’s a reason, which isn’t here. So being a reason for action isn’t the same as being a consideration that one ought to bear in mind when deliberating.

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Re: Philosophie...

Post  Admin on Wed 31 Aug - 9:13

For this week,it will be (for the last time in this book, the continuity of the last one’s…
Ought and most ought:
If it cannot be completed,we’ll have to abandon the functionalist programme that promised to explain the nature of reasons in a way that simply avoided the question whether the concept of a reason is the primary normative concept. Our other main option is to reverse our original direction,and to try to explicate ought in terms of some relation to reasons. This general programme is extremely attractive,for reasons that I now turn to investigate.
The matter can be brought out by considering the difficulties that Ross gets into when he tries to relate what he calls prima facie duty to what he calls duty proper. First, he says that the phrase “prima facie duty” must be apologized for, since it suggests that we are speaking of is a certain kind of duty, but something related in a special way to duty. Strictly speaking, we want not a phrase in which duty is qualified by an adjective, but a separate noun. Second, he says that prima facie duty may be called a parti-resultant attribute,one which belongs to an act in virtue of some one component in its nature. Being one’s duty is a toti-resultant attribute,one which belongs to an act in virtue of its whole nature and of nothing less than this. Each of these claims causes problems.
The first one is akward because by denying that prima facie duty is duty in any one sense, Ross makes it impossible for himself to make sense of the idea that duty proper is in some sense the product of various normative pushes or forces coming up from below, from the various features that stand as reasons. Ross effectively maintains that there’s nothing like duty at the contributory level, and so leaves nothing there that we can think of as contributing to duty. But this is so sever what he has to say about duty from its proper ground. To put the matter another way; we have to find some way of understanding right-making features so that the right in right-making is the rightness of duty proper, and Ross has prevented himself from doing that.
The second one is awkward because it reinforces the divide between duty proper and the things that contribute to it. If the ground for duty proper is really every feature of the relevant action, and the ground for prima facie duty is some particular feature or other, we have deprived the relevant right-making features (which occur at the contributory level) of the ability to be what in some preferential sense make the action right. It’s impossible to conceive how they can be what make the action right because we have been explicitly told that they play no special role in the construction of duty proper,no role, that’s, that’s not played by every feature of the action whatever, including even the reasons of the other side.

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Re: Philosophie...

Post  Admin on Wed 7 Sep - 11:19

Hello everyone! For this week,it’s a new book, very good… Cosmology,Religion and Philosophy of Rudolf Steiner:
Thus it comes about that the sciences studied to-day merge into that realm which opens up spiritual science in the modern sense. It happens not only in the separate realms of Natural Science and History,but also, in medicine; and in all provinces of practical life,in art,in morals,and in social life. It happens also in religious experiences. In rhese lectures 3 of these provinces are to be dealt with,and it’s to be shown how they merge into the modern spiritual view. The 3 are philosophy, cosmology and religion. At are time philosophy was the intermediary for all human knowledge. In its logos man acquired knowledge of the distinct provinces or world-reality. The different sciences are born of its substance. But what was remained of philosophy itself? A number of more or less abstract ideas which have to justify their existence in face of the other sciences, whose justification is found in observation through the senses and in experiment. To what do the ideas of philosophy refer?That has to-day become an important decision. We find in these ideas no longer a direct reality, and so we try to find a theoretical basis for this reality. And more: Philosophy,and its very name,love of wisdom shows that it’s not merely an affair of the intellect, but of the entire human soul. What one can love is such a thing, and there was a time when wisdom was considered something real, which isn’t the case with ideas which engage only reason and intellect. Philosophy, from being a matter for all mankind which once was felt in the warmth of the soul, has become dry, cold knowledge:we no longer feel ourselves in the midst of reality when we occupy ourselves with philosophizing. In mankind itself that has been lost which once made philosophy a real experience. Natural science (of the outer world) is conducted by means of the senses, and what reason thinks concerning the observations made by the senses is a putting-together of the content derived through the senses. This thought has no content of its own ; and while man lives in such knowledge he knows himself only as a physical body. But philosophy was originally a soul-content which wasn’t experienced by the physical body, but by a human organism which cannot be appreciated by the senses. This is the etheric body, forming the basis of the physical body, and this contains the supersensible powers which give shape and life to the physical body. Man can use the organization of this etheric body just as he can that of the physical. This etheric body draws ideas from the suoersensible world,just as the physical body does,through the senses,from the sense world. The ancient philosophers developed their ideas through this etheric body, and as the spiritual life of man has lost this etheric body and its knowledge,philosophy has simultaneous lost its character of reality. We must first of all recover the knowledge of etheric man, and then philosophy will be able to regain its character of reality. This must mark the first of the steps to be taken by anthroposophy. Cosmology once upon a time showed man how he’s a member of the universe. To this end it was necessary that not only his body but also his soul and spirit could be regarded as members of the cosmos; and this was the case because in the cosmos things of the soul and things of the spirit were visible.

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Re: Philosophie...

Post  Admin on Wed 14 Sep - 11:01

Hello everyone! For this week,I chosed something more spiritual than philosophical… It’s in the same book of last week. Cosmology,Religion and Philosophy/Rudolf Steiner.
A higher activity of knowledge which’s forthcoming when meditation is extended ,is required for cosmology. Not only is intensive quietness cultivated on a soul-content or subject matter but also a fully conscious stationary condition of the quiet, content-less soul. This is after the meditative soul-content or subject matter has been banished from the consciousness. The stage is reached where the spiritual content of the cosmos flows into the empty soul, the stage of inspired cognition. We have in part of us a spiritual cosmos,just as we have a physical cosmos before the senses. We succeed in seeing, in the powers of the spiritual cosmos, what takes place spiritually between man and the cosmos in the process of breathing. In this and the other rhythmic processes of man we find the physical reproduction of what exists in the spiritual sphere in human astral organization. We attain to the vision of how this astral organism has its place in the spiritual cosmos outside the life on earth, and how it takes on the cloak of the physical organism through embryonic life and birth, to lay it down again in death. By means of this knowledge we can distinguish between heredity,which is an earthly phenomenon, and that which man brings with him from the spiritual world. In this way,through inspired knowledge, we attain to a cosmology which can embrace man in respect of his psychic and spiritual existence. Inspired knowledge is cultivated in the astral organism because we experience an existence outside our bodies in the cosmos of the spirit. But the same thing happens in the etheric organism; and we can translate this knowledge into human speech in the images which present themselves in this sphere,and we can harmonize it with the content of philosophy. So we get a cosmic philosophy. For religious cognition a third thing is necessary. We must dive down into those existences which reveal themselves in picture from as the content of inspired knowledge; this is attained when we add soul-exercsises of the will to the kind of meditation which we have till now been describing.

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Re: Philosophie...

Post  Admin on Wed 21 Sep - 12:42

Hello everyone! For this week,it’s a good part of the same book than last week… I can seem boring with that,but it’s always the better of what I read during the week… I read and listen many books,and I’d said all what I wanted to say about myself…
The first experience which we can win through such an inner labour is a review of the course of our own past life on earth. We see it as it has progressed by means of the powers of growth from childhood upwards. We see it in thought-pictures which are condensed into powers of growth. They aren’t simply remembered scenes of our own life which we have before us. They are pictures of an etheric course of events, which have happened in our own existence,without having been taken into the ordinary consciousness. That which the consciousness and memory hold is only the abstract accompanying appearance of the real course.
It’s,as it were, a surface wave which is in its shape the result of something deeper. In the process of viewing this progress the working of the etheric cosmos on man is brought out. We can experience this work as the subject-matter of Philosophy. It’s wisdom, not in the abstract form of the conception, but rather in the form of the working of the etheric in the cosmos. In ordinary consciousness it’s only the young child who has not yet learnt to speak who’s in the same relationship to the cosmos as the man who uses his imagination correctly. The child has not yet separated the powers of thought from the general (etheric) powers of growth. This happens only when he learns to speak. Then the powers of abstract thought are separated from the universal powers of growth which alone were previously present. In the course of his later life man has these powers of abstract thought,but they are part of his physical organism,and aren’t taken up into his etheric being. He cannot, therefore,bring his relationship to the etheric world into his consciousness. He can learn to do this,through imagination.

It must be clearly emphasized that here the capacity must be developed again to obliterate when one likes pictures which have previously been taken up in meditation by one’s freewill. It’s not enough to obliterate presentations which have not been implanted in the consciousness by free choice. It requires a greater psychic effort to abolish pictures which have been created in meditation than to extinguish those which have entered into the consciousness in another way. And we need this greater effort to advance in supersensible knowledge. On such lines we achieve a wakeful, but quite empty soul-life; we remain in conscious wakefulness. If this condition is experienced in full thoughtfulness the soul life; we remain in conscious wakefulness. If this condition is experienced in full thoughtfulness the soul becomes filled with spiritual facts, as though the senses it’s filled with physical. And this is the condition of inspiration. We live an inner life in the cosmos just as we live an inner life in the physical organism. But we are aware that we are experiencing the cosmic life, that the spiritual things and processes of the cosmos are being revealed to us as our own inner soul-life. Now the possibility must have remained of always momentarily exchanging this inner experience of the cosmos with the condition of ordinary consciousness. We see in the cosmos that’s perceived by the senses a reproduction of what we have spiritually experienced.

It's a bad day,today... I'm very furious of the situation... My past was worst but it's hard to have less value then crazy people really...

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Re: Philosophie...

Post  Admin on Wed 28 Sep - 12:06

Hello everyone!For this week,it’s very simple… I chosed a part of:Philosophy and therapy of existence perspectives in existential analysis:
Similarly, in “I and thou” Buber rejects the ontological separation between self and other by describing the basis of existence as a 2-fold interaction between human beings and the world that furthermore can be separated into 2 kinds of attitudes. The secondary I-It attitude is the origin of the subject-experience in Descartes and Kant and represents a depersonalized sociality characterized by distance between the self (ego) and other beings. The primary I-Thou relationship is a mutual one that takes place as a meeting between people as persons with a whole existence and it involves love.
This true encounter represents personalized sociality and it resemble the authentic relationship in Heidegger’s theory. However, personal existence doesn’t derive from relation to one’s own. Being towards death. Rather, personal existence involves an including relationship with the other as part of a dialogical subjectivity.
Both Heidegger and Buber describe human being as constantly having to oscillate between 2 modes of sociality that they tend to conceive as ontologically neutral. However, Buber also explains modernity as containing an ontological crisis.
Thus,modernity involves a movement from loving I-thou modes of involvement to instrumental I-It ways of interrelating and in Buber there’s a strong tendency towards an ethical understanding of the I-thou attitude as more positive.
Sartre and the look: The first and second part of Sartre’s ontological elucidation of human existence in “Being and Nothingness” involves a distinction between 2 related realms of being:
1)the being of phenomena (being in itself),
2)and the human being of consciousness (being for itself). Fundamentally, this being for itself is freedom that’s nothingness and as such transcendent negation of being.
To reject solipsism,Sartre also introduces being for others as a third ontological category,accounting for a further aspect of human subjectivity. Originally, the other isn’t revealed to me as an object but as a free subject who makes me aware of my own objectiveness as potentially being seen through the others look as an object. Thereby, this existence of the other as subject is revealed to me as certain.
Through the look, the other as subject reveals me to myself as having a self that’s myself, and unlike in Descartes and Kant I cannot deduce this experience of me from my own consciousness. Rather,the experience is derived from an essential modification of my consciousness by others gaze. Thus,unlike Buber,I don’t become a whole person but a modified existence through the encounter with the other person. Furthermore,against Heidegger’s conception of Being with,this encounter involves alienation through:
… a negation which posits the original distinction between the other and myself as being such that it determines me by means of the other and determines the other by means of me…
The encounter with the other reveals that the relationship between me and the other person is internal and not external. However, my encounter with the other is one of negation of myself. It doesn’t only gives me an experience of the other as an inapprehensible alien but also of me as an outside that I’m partly alienated from because it’s not totally under my understanding of control: the other doesn’t constitute me as an object for myself but for him. In other words,I become aware of the other as a subject with a freedom that’s not my transcending my own transcendence in a way that I’m defenseless. To a certain extent my being for others is inapprehensible to me and it negates my capacity to freely interpret myself and though my encounter with the other constitutes possibilities to me those are alienated possibilities.

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