Philosophie...

Page 12 of 13 Previous  1, 2, 3 ... , 11, 12, 13  Next

View previous topic View next topic Go down

Re: Philosophie...

Post  Admin on Wed 5 Oct - 9:14

I’m waiting an answer for something important,I doubt very strongly of the result but… Always in:Philosophy and Therapy of existence perspectives in existential analysis…
Laing and the threat of the other:
While Sartre describes how we are objects of others look and how that make us feel exposed and imprisoned, in “the divided self” Laing investigates a similar experience in order to understand the subjectivity of schizophrenic persons. Both Sartre and Laing group their approach as existential phenomenology,but Laing’s ambition is therapeutic rather than philosophical. Like Sartre,Laing outlines the paradox that all human beings are at the same time separate from and related to other human beings as an essential part of their existence and, against Heidegger and Buber,that we are somehow alone because no other person is a necessary part of our being. Quite similar to Sartre,Laing also makes a distinction between one’s being for oneself and one’s being for the other and states that in any human relationship, the other is the object of intentionality for the own persons subjectivity.
This also applies within orthodox psychiatry, which experiences the patient through a technical “vocabulary of denigration” as a “failure of adjustment.” With the words of Sartre, the psychiatrist is thus involved in a transcendence of the patient’s transcendence by avoiding “thinking in terms of freedom,choice and responsibility” and relating to the other as a subject to an object,that’s only comprehensible within the prejudging language of the subject. Consequently,the relationship is a conflictual one of possession and alienation that creates the same division between consciousness and behavior involved the schizophrenic experience.
From an alternative position of love, the existential phenomenologist must leave his own world to learn how the patient experiences his world and himself in it. To do this, he must reorient himself towards a radical different way of being without prejudging the patient. Furthermore, Laing bears more resemblance to Buber than Sartre by opening the possibility for a close encounter if the schizophrenic meets someone “by whom he feels understood”. Yet, opposite Buber,Sartre fails to provide a full elucidation of this interrelatedness.
Apart from this, Laing gets close to Sartre’s description of the look, when he uncovers the schizoid as a person who:
...feels both more exposed,more vulnerable to others than we do, and more isolated…
Rather than being a meaningless failure, schizophrenia is understandable as an existential strategy that a person invents to live in a situation with unlivable external pressure. Schizophrenia arises in situations where the schizoid person is lacking ontological security, and this makes everyday living a perpetual threat to the person’s self.
As part of his insecurity, the schizoid person exoeriences sociality as a threatening reality, generating different types of anxiety. Thus, the eprson experience sociality as a negative dimension of existence:According to Laing, engulfment refers to a dread of losing one’s identity by interaction with others, and the person either gets involved in a constant battle or seeks isolation in order to avoid being absorbed by others. Petrification refers to the dread of being depersonalized as an object by the others look and turned into stone,and the only way to avoid this threat is to depersonalize the other by turning him into an object first. The resemblance to Sartre’s theory of being for others as a conflict regarding freedom is striking, although Laing only wishes to describe schizoid and not ordinary experience. This covers the fact that Sartre seeks to explore the ontological dimensions of sociality,while Laing rather wishes to explore its practical implications to certain people.
To Sartre,I become a myself through interaction with others,and Laing likewise describes how the schizoid person forms a false self-system by means of social interaction: The problem of being for others is analyzed as multiple self-systems that are established by identification of the self with the fantasy of the persons by whom one’s seen.

Admin
Admin

Messages : 735
Date d'inscription : 2009-01-10
Age : 34

View user profile http://verseau-quinny23.forumactif.com

Back to top Go down

Re: Philosophie...

Post  Admin on Wed 12 Oct - 11:06

Hello everyone!For this week,I chosed 2 parts of 2 books… 1)Philosophy abd therapy of existence perspectives in existential analysis and 2)Consciousness and its implications/Daniel N.Robinson.
1)Existential teleology and ethics:
Since the 1980’s,parts of philosophy has taken an interest in the revitalization of the ancient Greek teleological ethics as a response to the inability of modern moral philosophy, since Kant,to set concrete goals for life. The question of the good life was significant to ancient Greek and Roman Philosophy, but it has vanished from modern academic philosophy. Now the sciences and social institutions answer the questions of how to live and what the goal and purpose of life are, but they reduce the good life to a technological issue. Even though modern academic philosophy doesn’t take an interest in the good life,the existential tradition has reflected on human life and living since the middle of the 19th century. In this chapter, I’ll examine whether the existential tradition implies a teleological conception of the content and direction of the good life that can form an alternative basis for modern ethics. Based on an examination of Aristotle’s ethics and the ethics of the technological age, I’ll therefore outline the implicit teleological ethics in Soren Kierkegaard, Jean-Paul Sartre,Emmy van Deurzen and Michel Foucault.
From Aristotelian ethics to the ethics of the technological age:Philosophers and historians usually regard Aristotle’s ethics as one of the best representatives of an ancient Greek ethics. Aristotle’s ethical approach base on a strong version of teleology. Teleology is an explanation for a phenomenon in function of its end or goal. Aristotle explains the end or goal (causa finalis) of human existence as human flourishing. Human beings achieve flourishing through a balanced use of human reason in everyday living as well as through the contemplation of universal harmony. According to Arsitotle, the essence of human being is reason, and through the balanced use of reason in daily life,human being can cultivate a number of virtues and bring forth its substantial and universal form, which’s already potentially present in the individual.
According to Heidegger,this bringing-forth is a concealment of something into unconcealment,which makes it appear as it’s in itself. Bringing-forth is essential to the teleological reason of ancient Greece philosophy,and Heidegger states that it differs from the challenging that rules in modern technology as a dominant way of revealing Being in modern times. Through this technological revealing,the human beings of modernity position themselves in the middle of the world and assume dominion over everything,including themselves. Thus, things and human beings only have meaning by becoming available as resources that are under control.
2)Other Minds: The problem of how we know there are other minds than our own is part of the epistemological problem of how it’s that I know anything.
It’s more than a linguistic problem, as we shall see in this lecture,when we explore the positions taken by Ludwig Wittgenstein and the Scottish philosopher Thomas Reid, who countered skepticism with a pragmatic approach to the problem of other minds.
I. At the heart of a certain form of skepticism known as solipsism,is the question:How do I know there are any minds other than my own?
A) A solipsist is prepared to make no claim other than the fact of his own existence and mental life. The problem of other minds,then, is just the problem of answering the solipsist.
B)In one sense,the problem of other minds is cut from the same cloth as all fundamental problems in epistemology:Basically,the problem of other minds is just of the problem of how it’s that I know anything or claim that I know something.
1.I can perceive that I have a mind,but I cannot perceive any mind other than my own.
2.Even if an apparatus existed that could show us an image of another mind, another mind in a conscious state associated with pain, for example,we would have no knowledge of the pain as actually felt.
C)Ludwig Wittgenstein (1889-1951) held that language may not be a reliable guide to correctly interpreting the statements of another, as any 2 persons may associate 2 different meanings with a single word.
II.But the problem of other minds is surely not merely a linguistic problem.
A)The problem of other minds may be seen to arise once we attach all of our knowledge claims to direct perception.
B)It’s an evidentiary problem, in the sense that it becomes “problematical” only when we use the wrong sort of evidence.
C) If direct perception constitutes the only justification for claiming to know anything,then, in fact, whole realms of what we regard as the “known” become quite obscure.
1.I don’t directly perceive such laws as the laws of the internal combustionengine; my belief in term is inferential.
2.If I were a scientist,my belief would be based on the developed conception of the lawfulness of nature itself,namely, that if such laws weren’t persistent over time, the very coherence of the cosmos would be dissolved.
3.Little of such abstract reasoning is available at the level of direct perception.
D)It could be argued,however,that to talk of the “coherence of the cosmos” simply reflects another of our prejudices.
1. A “coherent cosmos” can arguably be thought of as just one of an infinitely larger number of pictures that might be drawn to capture the nature of reality.
2.This sort of question is at the heart of a contemporary issue this within philosophy of science that’s usually within philosophy of science that’s usually categorized as “realism versus antirealism”.
3. Do our scientific laws really express “reality”?
III.The pragmatic ground is one particular ground of justification for knowledge claims of any sort.
A)A pragmatic ground belongs to a class of assumptions or dispositions absent which the very conduct of life would become nearly impossible.

Admin
Admin

Messages : 735
Date d'inscription : 2009-01-10
Age : 34

View user profile http://verseau-quinny23.forumactif.com

Back to top Go down

Re: Philosophie...

Post  Admin on Tue 18 Oct - 9:50

Hello everyone!For this week it’s again in Consciousness and its implications/Robinson…
It’s a very good description between mental and physical which are intrinsiquely linked.
Physicalism refined: We have seen of the difficulties associated with explaining mental events on the basis of physical evidence. In this lecture,we examine 2 alternative theories, the identity theory,which doesn’t accept that there are uniquely mental events, and the supervenience theory, which requires that a person cannot move from one mental events and the supervenience theory,which requires that a person cannot move from one mental state to another without moving from one physical state to another.
2 alternative perspectives to explaining mental events on the basis of physical evidence are the identity theory and the supervenience theory.
The counterintuitive character of the identity theory presents difficulties,while its particular strength lies in the fact that it doesn’t aim to explain causal relationships between mental and physical events; it doesn’t accept the proposition that there are,in fact, bona fide and uniquely mental events.
Although there are various forms of the identity theory,they all proceed from an ontological position according to which there’s only one kind of entity in reality,namely, physical reality.
Thus,all forms of the identity theory adopt monistic materialism (or monistic physicalism),a term that pays deference to the fact that not everything physical has mass,for example, an electric charge.
Monistic physicalism asserts that whatever has real existence is physical.
Monistic physicalism explains immaterial entities with examples such as lightning,which is, in actuality , an electrical discharge.
Philosophers unse an identity of reference to distinguish from an identity of meaning.
The terms Morning Star and Evening Star refer to the same entity. Although 2 sentences containing these terms may well have different meanings,they have identical referents.
Similarly,it’s not that electrical discharges cause lightning. Electrical discharges are the lightning; both terms refer to the same phenomenon.
The identity theory can be illustrated thus: When Samantha says she has a toothache, she’s referring not to a mental state but to a brain state.
One argument to this effect has been advanced by the philosopher JJC Smart (1920) who, because he regards it as unbelievable,rejects an ontology that requires 2 radically different forms of reality,one physical and the other,who knows what?
The identity theory is parsimonious in that it reduces reality from a 2- substance to a single-substance affair.
Is the identity theory sound?
In its usual form, the identity theory asserts that mental states and processes, properly understood, are actually states and processes taking place in the brain.
On this account,there’s actually only one set of states and processes,namely,neurophysiological states and processes,not mental states as such.
The identity theory establishes the mental as physical.
The identity theory asserts that there’s not a relationship between 2 distinct entities, only one entity for which we seem to have 2 modes of expression.
This can be summarized by saying that M is identical to P,where M=mental states and P=physical states.
Considering the soundness of the theory requires considering the nature of identity relations in general.

But some have argued that there’s something that might be truthfully said about pain that could never be truthfully applied to statements about brain processes without a fundamental alteration in the truth of the statement itself.
Other objections to the identity theory include the position that however mental states and physical states are to be understood, it surely isn’t the case that, if they are identical, they are so necessarily.
We can imagine a world in which there are mental events without there being any physical events or a world in which mental events and physical events simply occur in parallel.
Obviously,the identity thesis cannot plausibly maintain that mental events just are physical events and are so necessarily.
Defenders of the identity theory get around this difficulty by arguing that the identity in question isn’t one of necessity but one of contingency.
Of all the things that mental events conceivably might have been,it’s just contingently the case that they are physical events.

Admin
Admin

Messages : 735
Date d'inscription : 2009-01-10
Age : 34

View user profile http://verseau-quinny23.forumactif.com

Back to top Go down

Re: Philosophie...

Post  Admin on Wed 26 Oct - 10:24

Hello everyone!For this week,it’s simple… It’s in continuity of last week… It consists to pull an unity between the body and the spirit...The same thing or phenomenon than I explained in French a few years ago…
The theory of supervenience owes its currency to Davidson,mental characteristics have a relationship with physical characteristics that’s depndent,or supervenient on them.
In its usual form,the theory doesn’t begin by denying mental states.
Defenders of supervenience theories are willing to retain the ordinary language used to refer ta various states and properties associated with psychological life, as well as to refer to various common items, such as tables.
In the case of a wooden table,for example, the wood supervenes on something more fundamental namely, molecules supervene on atoms,and so on.
We understand that there aren’t 2 ontologically distinct realms:one with a dining room table and another with atoms. We accept that the table is constituted of materials,some of them invisible, but absent these ,there would be no table.
A table cannot change its shape without an alteration in the physical properties on which the visible and palpable property of shape supervenes.
In terms of mental states, 2 persons cannot be different; a person cannot move from one mental state to another without moving from one physical state to another.
The problem with supervenience theory is that in every application of it where it seems sound, the properties in question don’t match up with anything that makes the “Mind-body problem” a problem.
Consciousness and Physics:It has been argued that the real problem with physicalism is that we don’t know enough about matter itself.
The explanation of the phenomenon of mental life may demand a physical science beyond our current reach. In this lecture,we look at arguments from the laws of thermodynamics and quantum physics in pursuit of a solution to the question of the unification of the physical and the mental.
Radical versions of physicalism fail at the level of our intuitions.
We rely on intuitions, where neither the force of logic nor the evidence of sense supports one account at the expense of all other accounts of complex phenomena.
Thoughts aren’t like things, and feelings have no shape, in which is sufficient for most persons to view the physicalist agenda as excessively optimistic.
More then one philosopher has suggested that such a judgment is premature.
Galen Strawson (1952),in his book Mental Reality, argues that the real problem with physicalism is that we simply don’t know enough about matter itself.
On an agnostic materialism view, the perplexing nature of the mind-body problem stems from unreasonable faith in our understanding of the fundamental nature of matter.
Strawson remains committed to monistic physicalism,but he remains neutral,or as he puts it “agnostic”,as to just what the physics of it all will prove to be.
It’s important to keep in mind that physics at the micro level is still a fairly young subject.
There are reasons to doubt that our current understanding of physics is up to the task of explaining conscious life, while the possibility remains that physics,especially quantum physics,may let be able to do so.

Autism,obsession,and compulsion:Knowing what happens when the functions of consciousness are defective may help us learn more about the nature of consciousness. In order to adapt to any particular environment, a normal sensory system resorts to active or passive filtration. This doesn’t happen in cases of autism and other neurotic disorders. Moreover, those with such disorders cannot come to know what it’s to be like someone else through conscious awareness and the integrative achivements of the mind.
Psychologists refer to our ability to continue a conversation when background noise is very loud as the cocktail party effect,and this includes the ability to control what we listen to when different sets of sound are present at the same time.
To be conscious is to be aware of something, and the process by which we are able to direct our awareness is attention.
Under normal circumstances,there are 2 principal means by which events in the external world are denied access to consciousness; both involve filtering.
One means is fixed and based on the operating characteristics of a particular sensory system.
The second means by which events in the external world are barred from entry into conscious awareness is that of active filtering,sometimes called selective attention (the cocktail party effect being a good example).
In the absence of such filtering it would be impossible to adapt to any environment.
The relationship between consciousness and awareness is direct,as is the relationship between awareness and attention.
If we cannot get outside our own consciousness in order to study it,in the same way that fish aren’t likely to discover water,for it’s the abiding condition of their lives,we might nevertheless learn more about the nature of consciousness by seeing what happens when its functions are defective.
There has been a surge in research in recent decades of childhood conditions that affect the functions of consciousness.
2 such conditions fall in the category of autism spectrum disorders (ASD) and include autism proper and Asperger’s syndrome.
Asperger’s syndrome is a mild form of autism disorder syndrome,and sufferers often have an elevated sensitivity to noise or loud sounds.
Those who suffer from autism spectrum disorders also have symptoms that seem closely tied to the failure to direct and maintain conscious awareness.
Such children are slower in learning to interpret what others think and feel.
Another such disorder is attention deficit hyperactivity disorder.
There are now many skeptics who are inclined to think that quite normal behavioral problems are being classified as one or another of these abnormal conditions.

Admin
Admin

Messages : 735
Date d'inscription : 2009-01-10
Age : 34

View user profile http://verseau-quinny23.forumactif.com

Back to top Go down

Re: Philosophie...

Post  Admin on Wed 2 Nov - 13:12

Hello everyone!For this week,it’s very simple… In a new book:Representations of Death/A social psychological perspective/Mary Bradbury.
The study of death can be approached in many ways. We can describe the process of dying,reveal the inequalities in demographic patterns of mortality,discuss the ethical debates raging around the point of death, attempt to describe the feelings of the bereaved,examine the institutions that deal with the dying and the dead or analyze mortuary rituals. In the past these topics have been divided into separate and discrete chunks. For example,broadly speaking,the study of rituals has become the domain of social anthropologists;the study of grief,the property of psychologists. However,it’s rarely possible or desirable to explore an aspect of death in isolation. If we are describing a death ritual we should also discuss the sentiments of the participants. The traditional boundaries that meant,for example,that sociologists wandered around hospitals and hospices observing the day-to-day work that went on while psychiatrists and psychologists interviewed grieving widows,are beginning to collapse. Many studies are breaking new ground. For example,Attig (1996),a philosopher,and Davies (1997), a theologian,both offer refreshing perspectives on the subject of grief and mourning.
Remaining within a sociological tradition of social psychology I make use of Moscovici’s (1984) theory of social representations and draw extensively on the work that came out of the Chicago School. This has certain repercussions. Adopting an essentially social view of mind and personhood I’m turning my back on individual models of grief and mourning. I want to bring into focus the construction of representations of death and loss through social interaction. In order to understand this process I’m going to stray into the fields of social anthropology and sociology. When we come to explore broad topics such as health,illness or death,this inclusive stance is necessary. Certainly, Radley (1994),one of the rare social psychologists who embraces a qualitative approach,found this to be the case in his analysis of health and illness; in this instance,he reviews medical sociology,health psychology and medical anthropology. As Radley notes “when we try to make sense of illness we find that we are, often unintentionally,also making sense of life,and perhaps ourselves as well.”
I was interested in studying death practices in a contemporary urban setting. I wanted to look at what people do and what people feel. As a consequence,I found myself facing the challenge of integrating the overlapping areas of grief,mourning, mortuary rituals,the institutions that deal with death and the industry that makes its profits from the dead.

Admin
Admin

Messages : 735
Date d'inscription : 2009-01-10
Age : 34

View user profile http://verseau-quinny23.forumactif.com

Back to top Go down

Re: Philosophie...

Post  Admin on Wed 9 Nov - 7:29

Good morning everyone!For this week,I chosed a book on death in ages and centuries… It’s a resume of what was death in earlier times.
Representations of Death/A social psychological perspective/Mary Bradbury:
In the last 200 years the processes of dying and disposal have undergone a transformation. The use of professionals to prepare the corpse and the practice of cremation are both examples of relatively recent innovations. Houlbrooke (1989) identifies the Victorian era in Great Britain as the time when social practices and attitudes changed most dramatically. He attempts to outline some of the social changes in the years before that contributed to this and identifies the following:the reformation,the rise of the natural sciences,the secular climate of opinion and the increasing influence of the medical profession. Other authors have argued that changing attitudes towards death can be explained by the rise of individualism in the western world. Houlbrooke questions the utility of citing such a global cause because,in practice,it’s difficult to identify the impact of individualism let alone define it.

Benoliel and Degner (1995) note that before the establishment of modern medicine,patterns of living  and of dying were quite different. Life was less predictable.Infant mortality was high and women often died in childbirth. The causes of most deaths then,such as influenza,pneumonia and tuberculosis,are now relatively easy to contain and treat. Even if a person was suffering from cancer it would often be an attack of pneumonia that would kill them.
As the science of medicine became established the promise of increased longevity or, at the very least,of reduced pain made the presence of a doctor at the point of death more common. The administration of opiates meant that it was possible to die in a relatively painfree state. So,providing the patients could afford the doctor and the drugs,they could aspire to die as if in sleep. Porter (1989),in his analysis of the role of the doctor in the 19th century,suggests that,rather than viewing disease and death as acts of God,doctors came to see disease as a natural cause of death. It therefore became acceptable for them to “manage” the death bed. Dying in a drug-induced unconscious state was seen as an ideal. This stands in contrast to the image of the good death of earlier centuries in which the dying remained conscious and interactive to the end. For the burgeoning middle classes with money to spend,dying,traditionally a sacred moment, was becoming a secular activity that was dominated by a new class of professionals. Priests,who used to play a central role in the drama of dying,were being usurped by the doctor.
The doctor became the person to step in between the individual and their death. The influence of the medical sciences on our death rites didn’t stop at the moment of death. This new science needed bodies for research purposes. In a wonderful study,Richardson (1988) has traced the impact of the anatomists on both our mortuary rituals and our representations of death. Although mortality rates were high in the 18th and 19th centuries,bodies for dissection were in short supply. Dissection was viewed with great distrust as people grappled with the theological complexities of the link between the state of the body and the state of the soul. As Richardson notes, dissection was viewed as a form of punishment, a fate worse than death. Only those who had died the most shameful of deaths were suitable candidates for dissection. Many bodies came from the hangman’s noose. It didn’t take long for the criminal classes to realize that a good income could be obtained through the unpleasant task of exhuming the newly and not-so-newly dead. Richardson notes that while the penalties for grave-robbing were relatively lenient,for the times,this was still a dangerous occupation; one would not want to be found by an angry mob. Generally the resurrectionists favoured robbing paupers graves:large pits into which many bodies were piled. During the last decades of the 18th century fresh or anatomically unusual corpses could command handsome prices.

Admin
Admin

Messages : 735
Date d'inscription : 2009-01-10
Age : 34

View user profile http://verseau-quinny23.forumactif.com

Back to top Go down

Re: Philosophie...

Post  Admin on Mon 14 Nov - 19:34

Dear Prime Minister of Quebec,I’m writing you right now not being angry or sad or disagree with you and your decision about the “shit people” in this society… I’m on that,I’d made multiple programs… Inunderstand your reasons and meanings to your changes in this domain… But you have a “ecocomical view” on the problem and not a philosophical one’s...I’m trying here to explain my point of view of our society. Iworked in bars for many years and it had been many consequences to that,I deshonored a big Hell’s Angel in 2006,I’d been drugued in chloroform and didn’t know if I will survive to this day. You’ll say than I’m crazy,yes,I’m pretty sure… To verify my story I give you this:Normand Larochelle SQ MRC Bellechasse,de St-gervais 418-8874058 fax:418-887-6487.what’s the cause of all that shit than evitently you have too much here?Is it a drug problem?family drama problem?their environment? Their habits and behavior?I’m agree with the fact that “chemical drugs” are a plague in Quebec. Mnay of them are on invalidity in short-term...For my part,I took the last years to learn english and enlarge my vision of the world… I compare your new law 70 to the 13th aamendment in US… to fight drugs and criminals… Their governmental fighting against drugs  had as results overpopulation in american prisons. Never all will be official,and the official can’t never be all in this society. Many aspects of everyday life is hidden behind a whole world of apperances. To my point of view,the most dangerous people here (in Quebec city,where i’m living),are these who had the big check by the governement,but you don’t saw every trouble and misery they can cause because they are just crazy… Here,where I’m living (I’m waiting for a HLM soon),I should take care of the 2 other persons who live here with me,who had the big check because they are invalid,I’m just paying less of rent to take care of them on many plans,all the clean-up of the place,the dishes,all… One isn’t able to read,to write or to count. The other is a severe alcoholic.And if I wasn’t there,they couldn’t keep the place “clean”...With my past,I’m not able to be where it has a loud music or noses… I’m not able to be with many people around me. Since many years,my life is in my books.I’d never been home in Quebec province,I’d never had this feeling of home...I’m always in the home of another… The survival for a woman here is very difficult because I’m everyday harassed sexually...and I don’t want any of them. MY only ove is my cat than I cherish more than anything else. I passed these last years very occupied,not officially,but really...I’d cleared all of my past and my life is a little better today without them in. I’had a daugther a few years ago,but I was in the street and I don’t have a real family...not a loving one’s if I can say. I have my DES,but nothing else officially… Really,I’d learned to speak in english currently and I’d read a lot of books of many kinds,history,science,philosophy,sociology...but nothing of this will appear officially… And I don’t know what to do with that,because I can’t have a CV like you do habitually.. When I was young,with my genitors,I was a serious case of mental illness in suicide domain… Normand Larochelle could tell you a lot about this… But medically,officially,I’m not crazy...and this ambiguous situation means a lot of struggle and difficulties for me...I’m very good with computers… The trail for us is an offical one’s… But many doesn’t fit in this trail… Because of who they are… The human mind doesn’t reasoning like a computer,you know that… It may be similar in some aspects,like memorization,calcuclus but nothing at all with family,environment,the mentality around you...When the people look at us often see “bullshit person”,but if you look in the trail of life of the individual,you’ll see than the process of memory could be against you in a few years just like in the US. For me,I don’t see any trail for me,because I’m not fitting in… I have many skills but no diploma to prove it. And it’s true than I’m weird person...I’m conscious then I’m not living in the same world of my childhood friends for examples… I’d been always the “shame” in my school,but I always succeed. My entire family is a shame for me and many. What could I do for you? Considering my past and where you had cased me many years ago in the “category bullshit people”… But I’m not enough crazy to have a safe life… I would like to be normal,but I know than I can’t… We’re living in 2 separate worlds… Believe it or not,it’s more difficult in all domains to survive in poverty then to work 5 days/week… It’s not easy… But where can I go in all this? I would like to use my english somewhere...but where abd with who?And what kind of business will want to take a bullshit girl in their big company with big reputation,a nude dancer who had finished in big depression… and doesn’t have anything else to share about me except than the family where I’d born is “fucking crazy”...My father was incestuous on his 3 daughters,only my brother had survived correctly,because he was a boy… He’d leaved the Quebec in the same time than I came to Quebec city… My childhood was in ste-claire de bellechasse. He lives in Alberta and have a good life in mechanic… I’m very happy for him...but for the girls,we are all bullshit people now… And in my point of view,the multicultural openness of Quebec will kill him in relatively short time. To illustrate this idea:look in Europe,Poland,Britain,France...US… Look at the Japan for example,the muslims can’t go there...and they don’t have any trouble about them inside their territory. I’d lived with 6 arabs in the last years...and what they are officially is not representative of who they are really… If you don’t understand that many problems are coming…
Many people in my environment aren’t able to work or to be functionate in the society because their mind id dead of any knowledge,passion or faith in the future...They’re like zombies and you give them the big check to be that… Some others want sincerely be normal in society,but it’s very difficult to be someone to someone else eye who don’t see you that way… If the Quebec is able to give me a real home here,maybe than I’ll feel home here...and of some some part of it...what’s not the case now… I made with the last years  a big wall around me,my world is in english,I use the french one’s only for the purpose to talk to my behavior...but they totally ignore what this means.
Thank you if you had pay attention to me,I’m very not sure,you will...But I took the chance…
Thank you for your understanding than your world isn’t the same of me… It’s just like another planet...do you understand?and each world can’t understand the other because they don’t speak on the sane frequency. what’s the most important,to give to the invalids people more to their comfortand freedom while they cause many “911”calls...anywhere for their mentally problems… If you want to bring out of the shit the people who aren’t really shit...do it in a good way of intentions,because your intentions is the direction of your law and programs… I’m hoping than you’ll understand.
Thanks for your attention,Jacynthe

Admin
Admin

Messages : 735
Date d'inscription : 2009-01-10
Age : 34

View user profile http://verseau-quinny23.forumactif.com

Back to top Go down

Re: Philosophie...

Post  Admin on Wed 23 Nov - 10:37

Hello everyone!For this week,I’d chosed a new book of study:Media Psychology/David Giles.
Defining Territory:specialist fields of psychology have appeared at an even-increasing many of those fields are defined by practice,3 examples are clinical psychology, educational psychology, and industrial psychology. They emerge due to a social or commercial demand for the application of psychological theory and research in a non-academic environment. Within academia,broad fields have been defined in attempts to classify general approaches to psychology,cognitive psychology, social psychology,and developmental psychology, for instance. Other fields may be defined by a particular methodological approach or theoretical perspective,such as connectionist psychology,critical psychology ,or behaviorism. These are often described as “school of thought” rather than subdisciplines in their own right. Finally, there are fields that can be defined on the basis of topic,such as parapsychology, (cross-) cultural psychology,or the psychology of music. These fields may incorporate perspectives from broader fields (cognitive, social,and developmental psychology) but don’t have to be dominated by any particular theoretical or methodological approach.Media psychology is probably closest to this final,topic-defined type of field.Such fields are brought into being as a result of books (such as this one),journals,conferences, and specialist teaching modules. Media psychology potentially covers an enormous scope,wider, for example,than the psychology of music. This is partly because there are already a number of established fields that could be accomodated within media psychology,such as the psychology of advertising and the psychology of the internet. What makes media psychology unusual among specialist psychology fields,however, is that much of the work has already been done in disciplines outside psychology.

In particular,pressure is being placed on media scholars to concentrate as much on audiences as on the media texts themselves, a prospect that, as far as Gauntlett was concerned,requires a level of empirical research that may be beyond the interests (and methodological capabilities) of cultural scholars. He maintained that media scholars should,instead, concentrate on cyberspace and other new media,which offer new and exciting avenues of cultural exploration. Gauntlett’s views are in no way typical of those of media scholars in general. European or American. However,they do highlight a growing concern for media studies in their need to consider new technological forms. They also reflect the suggestion of Livingstone (1999) that audience research has reached a “crossroads” whereby it’s no longer sufficient to merely study the content of media; one must now engage at a special level with the practices of media use in general. I would argue that this is a project that’s ideally suited to social psychology.
How,then,to chart the territory of media psychology? To begin with,there’s a danger of media psychology becoming so broad that it begins to swallow up other topics in which the media plays an important role, such as political psychology. Clearly,there are important issues around the dissemination of political propaganda or government policy,and media influences on voting behaviour and the popularity of politicians. But it must be remembered that politics is, to some extent, a premedia phenomenon. Admittedly, the presentation of electoral candidates has been shaped by the media in democratic societies,and of course political action has always depended on some form of medium in order to mobilise communities. However,the nature of politics itself and the psychological processes that govern political thought and opinion that constitute the field of political psychology, require many philosophical, theoretical, and methodological considerations that may be beyond the scope of media psychology.
We can go no further,then,without first establishing a boundary.What do we mean by “media”,and what elements of media are, or should be, of interest to psychologists? If political psychology is excluded from media psychology on the grounds of its status as a premedia phenomenon, this suggests that history is a prime consideration. However, behaviours such as aggression and sex, or fundamental social and psychological processes such as discourse and cognition,are universal human phenomena that would occur,or so we assume,under any historical conditions. Thus,the key issue is: How might the media have influenced these behaviours and processes?

Admin
Admin

Messages : 735
Date d'inscription : 2009-01-10
Age : 34

View user profile http://verseau-quinny23.forumactif.com

Back to top Go down

Re: Philosophie...

Post  Admin on Thu 1 Dec - 12:16

Hi everyone!For this week,it will be ordinary… Media and Psychology/David Giles.
Psychology and Media:an uneasy relationship?:
Why do so many psychologists still regard television as nothing more than a tin box generating visual stimuli,while the rest of the world is constantly digesting and regurgitating its contents? One of the reasons for psychology’s slowness in picking up on the influence of media is that, as a young science,it has been cautious in its selection of topics for inquiry. Partly this caution derives from its uncertain status as a science,so there has been a neglect of topics that don’t easily lend themselves to measurement,preferably in the context of the laboratory. This caution isn’t peculiar to psychology. Within academia in general,the media aren’t considered a fit topic for academic research;many media researchers can recall snooty comments from colleagues about their interest in the trivia and junk of media culture. This attitude has trickled down to the student body. One of my third-year students reportedly said to another,”surely you can’t be studying reality TV for your final year project?”
These aren’t stuffy,fogeyish young people,but they feel that academia is no place in which to pick apart their leisure pursuits. Negative attitudes to the serious study of media pervade far beyond the academy: in the UK, even as recently as 1993,the Eduacation Secretary of the Conservative government referred to media studies as “Cultural Disneyland for the weaker minded.”
Furthermore,the media themselves aren’t above pouring scorn in serious attempts to study popular culture. Every few months, on quieter news days, an end-piece story will appear about a Ph.D student at some university who’s conducting a thesis on Madonna or “Big Brother”, and newsreaders will raise a quizzical eyebrow and wonder which government body is chucking away taxpayers money on such frivolous pursuits. Although cultural snobbery and concerns for psychology’s scientific credibility may partly explain its lack of interest in media,there are other factors as well. The place of technological change over the last century,and the rapidity of associated social upheavals,have made it difficult for serious research to get to grisps with either. The current climate of speculation about the future social consequences of the internet and virtual reality echo the speculation that initially surrounded radio and television. Every decade in the last 50 years has seen major developments in mass communications and media. Keeping a finger on the pulse of change is difficulty when you are trying to discover universal truths about human nature.

Most of these studies were instigated by a concern that, far from being a harmless box of tricks in the corner of the living room,the television is a source of imagery and information that’s capable of turning acquiescent and innocent little children into gormless zombies,or, worse, mass murderers. This research is largely the legacy of behaviourism,and is discussed in full part II of the book. It’s however,symptomatic of much psychological research that it’s essentially problem driven,rather than curiosity driver. In other words,the research has been conducted in response to calls for scientific evidence for the harmful influence of media,rather than an intellectual need to understand how media in general might influence behaviour. As a result, studies have been devised that have the best chance of securing a statistically significant outcome for a causal relationship between violent media and aggressive behaviour. The resultant literature enabled Leonard Eron,one of the leading researchers in the area, to claim that the causal link between media violence and aggression is as powerful as the link between cigarette smoking and lung cancer.
Despite widespread agreement as to the short-comings of much experimental research on media violence,its legacy has been bequeathed tp the media themselves,and to politicians,who continue to make unsubstantiated statements about the direct relationship between media violence and antisocial behaviour.

Admin
Admin

Messages : 735
Date d'inscription : 2009-01-10
Age : 34

View user profile http://verseau-quinny23.forumactif.com

Back to top Go down

Re: Philosophie...

Post  Admin on Wed 7 Dec - 11:15

Hello everyone!For this week,it’s the continuity of the same book than last week. I’m 34 years old now,and I feel very old now… I’m waiting for my home,I hope this year… I wish you a very good 2017 year!
Overwhelmingly,cultural psychology draws its data from premedia cultural contexts and from parts of the globe where media influence is less evident than in the West. There’s a clear bias toward “cultural durability”, implying that technologically oriented cultures are fleeting and insubstantial,and that culture isn’t worth studying unless ingrained over several centuries. Any contemporary theory of the role of culture in psychology ought to take media culture into consideration. In effect,this book is about not ignoring media, or taking them for granted,in the study of psychology.
Practising Media Psychology:
One final consideration in this introductory chapter is about the notion of media psychology as a practice rather than, or as well as,a field of academic research. The latter is broadly the approach of the American psychological association (APA),who have had a division (number 46) of media psychology since 1986. The interests of the division are split between, on the one hand,providing training and advice for psychologists appearing in the media, and on the other,promoting findings of research on psychological aspects of media. The APA have published 2 edited books about psychology and the media. These follow the interests of the division in that they are split into sections dealing with research and practice. Most of the “practice chapters consist of anecdotal material from psychologists working in the media and sound advice for psychologists appearing on radio or television. The idea of media psychology as a practice may seem a little strange,because there’s not much a psychologist can do within the media apart from the usual practices of occupational psychology,such as advising on organisational practice,or offering counselling or human resource management services. The British Psychological Society (PBS) issue guidelines to members that regulate their performance in the media. For example, the BPS discourages members from discussing psychological topics outside their field of expertise. The object of these guidelines is sensible enough,to prevent “quackery” and the promotion of individual interests above those of the discipline. However, there are many occasions when psychologists appear in the media not as representatives of the discipline or profession,but as individual authors or academics. There’s a difference between being interviewed as “David Giles,author of Media Psychology”,David Giles,senior lecturer in psychology at Coventry University”, and “David Giles,psychologist.” Only in the final role would I feel pressure to abide by BPS guidelines,unless I was interviewed in connection with a presentation at a BPS conference or a paper in a BPS journal. The situation is even less clearcut in countries like Norway and Sweden,where university researchers are required by contract to present their findings to the media,potentially leading to a 3-way conflict of interests. In the future,professional bodies may feel the need to exert greater control over the appearance and conduct of their members in the media. It may be that psychologists will eventually require chartering in order to call themselves psychologists in the media (although the media apply their own labels regardless).

Admin
Admin

Messages : 735
Date d'inscription : 2009-01-10
Age : 34

View user profile http://verseau-quinny23.forumactif.com

Back to top Go down

Re: Philosophie...

Post  Admin on Wed 14 Dec - 10:07

Hello everyone!For the last time for a while,it’s a part of Media psychology/David Giles,next week,it will be about John Locke…Think about North Korea and some countries like this one’s...
McLuhan and Postmodernism:
The negativity of the early media theorists was soon under attack from several fronts. First of all,Marshall McLuhan issued his famous statement “The medium is the message”, and, as discussed in the previous chapter, challenged the notion of media as inherently dangerous. Each new medium,he argued ,forced a radical reappraisal of what media were,and affected social change accordingly.For example, although the car didn’t change society simply through its function or meaning, it opened up social mobility and this,in turn, transformed the way we live.
Seen in this light,it’s television itself,not the political machinations of governments,that has turned the world into a “global village”. Critics of McLuhan labelled his vision “technological determinism”; others, such as Hans Enzensberger (1974),went further,calling him “reactionary”, a “charlatan”, and his views “idiocy”. Enzensberger was a Marxist but rejected the pessimism of the Frankfurt School,instead exploring the possibilities of mass media for a radical “challenge to bourgeois power”, a sentiment later echoed by many minority political groups with regard to the potential of the internet.
In some respects,McLuhan’s comments about the postwar mass media are more applicable to contemporary cable and digital communications than to “terrestrial” media. The state has always had to regulate traditional broadcasting,because in any country the portion of electromagnetic spectrum suitable for broadcasting is limited,and radio and television have to complete with each users such as the armed forces and emergency services.Nevertheless,there are now hardly any communities on the planet that have not found a use for television or, more recently.
Internet technology;as with the car,these media have created possibilities for social change. However,whether they have determined these changes is arguable. In historical terms,the problem is that the rise of the mass media have coincided with so many other profound social and political developments that causation is impossible to infer,although their association with these developments is undeniable.
McLuhan’s theories,”apolitical” to many, have echoes in later post-modernist theories of media. Postmodernism is a problematic term because it’s used to describe a historical period (the period after “modernism”),an artistic phase of development, and a theoretical position; one can be a “postmodernist” thinker or artist, but this doesn’t necessarily mean that one is living through a “postmodern” age. Many writers prefer the term late modernity to describe the current point in history.
In artistic terms,postmodernism usually refers to a break with tradition characterised by the collapse of the former canon of value,for example,mixing and matching architectural styles from previous periods,and its use in theory or philosophy has similar connotations. In psychology, postmodernism has been invoked in order to challenge traditional scientific methodologies and theories,and to urge a more eclectic approach. Postmodernism has been applied to the media in a variety of contexts. To begin with,grand social theory has looked at the changes wrought by media on an international scale; for example,the work of Jean Baudrillard (1988). Baudrillard was one of the first writers to discuss media and communications as systems circulating,above all else,information (as opposed to “messages”,images,or propaganda).

Admin
Admin

Messages : 735
Date d'inscription : 2009-01-10
Age : 34

View user profile http://verseau-quinny23.forumactif.com

Back to top Go down

Re: Philosophie...

Post  Admin on Thu 22 Dec - 8:28

Hello everyone! For this week,I chosed John Locke and his philosophy…
Locke on personal identity/Galen Strawson.
“Person”,Locke’s definition:
(Often in our world a lot of people don’t coincide with this definition and the society give them a lot of importance and/or the society doesn’t account for that). I’m an individual agent,a thinking being, a persisting human subject of experience,very much as I think I am. All this is clear. But what am I insofar as I am a Person, a person in Locke’s sense? This still doesn’t seem so clear,and I’m now going to go in more detail over some ground I’ve already briefly surveyed.
The first answer is terminological:the person I am is the self that I am:
Person,as I take it, is the name of this self. Wherever a man finds what he calls himself, there,I think,another may say is the same person. It’s also true by definition,for Locke,and crucially, that Persons are “capable of a law,and happiness,and misery.”

The most general description of what constitutes me as a Person,however is: anything of which I am Conscious. This description encompasses (M) and (I) (and so (S)),on the account of consciousness given above,but there’s,vitally,more.
The third and most crucial component consists of everything else,everything other than (M) and (I), of which I’m conscious at t,(A) all the actions and experiences,past and present,of the individual persisting subject of experience that I am of which I’m now (occurently or dispositionally) conscious at t. If we stick to the full ontological idiom,in which these actions and experiences are literally components of the Person,the addition of (A) has the consequence,already noted,that we are,considered as Persons,very oddly shaped entities. For consciousness of the past is a very fine-grained matter,in Locke’s view. It may as remarked pick up one thing I did on my birthday 20 years ago and completely fail to pick up a thousand other things I did on that day,things I’ve completely forgotten and am no longer concerned in in any way.
This is because it’s only “that with which the consciousness of this present thinking thing can now join itself that makes the same person, and is one self with it.” The present thinking being that I am attributes to itself, and owns all the actions of that thing, as its own,as far as that consciousness reaches,and no farther.
So it’s that if there be any part of ( an immaterial substance’s) existence,which I cannot upon recollection join with that present consciousness, whereby I’m now my self,it’s in that part of its existence no more my self, than any other immaterial being.

Admin
Admin

Messages : 735
Date d'inscription : 2009-01-10
Age : 34

View user profile http://verseau-quinny23.forumactif.com

Back to top Go down

Re: Philosophie...

Post  Admin on Thu 29 Dec - 10:51

Hello everyone!This week is again with Locke and the fact that it’s more and more rare in this world when you look at this cautiously..
I’ve left until last the most famous definitional passage,according to which a Person is a thinking intelligent being, that has reason and reflection,and can consider itself as it self,the same thinking thing,in different times and places; which it does only by that consciousness which is inseparable from thinking,and,as it seems to me,essential to it…partly because I think that the passage has often been misread. It’s been cited without sufficient attention to the fact that a Lockean person is essentially “capable of law,and happiness, and misery”, and the fact that “person” is, for Locke,a forensic term.I also think that the word “thinking”, which Locke often explicitly uses in the Wide Cartesian sense,has sometimes been read too narrowly.So let me now try to display Locke’s definition of a Person as a set of singly necessary and jointly sufficient conditions,using only his words.
Certainly a Person is a 1.thinking 2.intelligent being that has 3.reason and 4.reflection.
These 4 things are ground-floor necessary conditions,essential preconditions,of being a Person,and there is I believe no redundancy in this list. Thinking,1,may be understood in the widest cartesian sense to cover all conscious mental goings-on, the simplest cases of which are mere sensation. Intelligent,2,further requires a certain level of mental sophistication additional to 1 (at the very least,it requires cognition in addition to sensation). Reason,3,further specifies the required level of sophistication (a creature can cognize that things are the case without being able to reason;it can grasp propositions without any capacity for inference). Reflection,4,is in turn an addition to reason. It’s not only “that notice which the mind takes of its own operations, and the manner of them, by reason whereof there come to be ideas of these operations in the understanding”;it’s also a capacity,the capacity for higher-order thought,the capacity to think explicitly about one’s thinking (reflexio),which we possess and nonhuman animals don’t.
1 and 4 are necessary sensory cognitive capacity conditions of Personhood,but they’re not sufficient. Nor are they the focus of the definition: the passage has yet to tell us what it’s about such sophisticated subject of experience that makes it a Person. The crucial addition,when it comes to Personhood,so far as cognitive capacity conditions are concerned,is that the thing in question 5 can consider itself as itself and,more particularly,6 can consider itself as itself,the same thinking thing.in different times and places.
5 goes beyond 4 in stating that a Person is fully or expressly self-conscious in the way defined. It’s a familiar point that a being could fulfill condition 4,and be able to take its own thoughts as objects of thought,without being fully self-conscious, without being capable of thinking of itself specifically as itself. The full self-consciousness of 5, however,is still not enough for Personhood. For a creature that entirely lacked memory and foresight could possibly be fully self-conscious, but it would fail to qualify as a Person in Locke’s scheme,because a Person’s self-consciousness must have genuine temporal reach.

Admin
Admin

Messages : 735
Date d'inscription : 2009-01-10
Age : 34

View user profile http://verseau-quinny23.forumactif.com

Back to top Go down

Re: Philosophie...

Post  Admin on Thu 5 Jan - 10:19

Happy New Year everyone!For this week,I chosed the philosophy of Locke in continuity with last week…
This is essential if it’s to be proper subject of punishment and reward. Locke then states that a Person’s fulfillment of conditions 5 and 6 depends essentially on the fact that it possesses 7 consciousness. A being can consider itself as itself in the required way,he says,”only by that consciousness which is inseparable from thinking,and,as it seems to me,essential to it.”
It may be said that this is obvious.Of course 5 requires 7: of course self-consciousness requires consciousness. In fact Consciousness 7 is already entailed by 1,thinking,as Locke has just said. So why does he mention it only now? Why does explicit reference to consciousness occur only at this point in the definition? One reason,I think, is that consciousness is essentially a kind of reflexitivity,and thus has a special foundational connection with 5, which’s itself a special case of reflexivity. But,this noted,it should be said again that all thinking/experiencing animals have 7 the basic reflexivity of Consciousness that’s essentially constitutive of any 1 thinking-experiencing at all, even mere sentience. So although 7 is necessary for 5,the capacity for full self-consciousness,it’s certainly not sufficient.
What’s also necessary for 5,by way of reflexivity,is no doubt 4, the more sophisticated capacity for reflection which we have and other animals lack.
4 as defined isn’t on its own sufficient to turn consciousness into full self-consciousness for a creature could be able to think about its thinking without thinking (or being able to think) of its thinking as its own. True enough, but so be it. In including a requirement of full self-consciousness among the conditions of personhood,Locke isn’t trying to produce a statement of the sufficient conditions of full self-consciousness.
So far we have a statement of the basic mental cognitive capacities that must be possessed by anything that’s to count as a person. But this is not all. For consciousness,as we have seen,is inseparable from concernment. It follows that a Person is, by definition, necessarily 8 concerned for itself. This requirement,however,doesn’t distinguish a person from any other sentient creature, for all sentient creatures are conscious, on Locke’s view,and so concerned for themselves, and the final and fundamental remaining condition on being a person is that a person 9 is capable of law,and happiness,and misery. When it’s found in a person,concernment has an essentially moral dimension,and it’s 9 and 6 that state what’s most truly distinctive about being a person. 9 depends on 6,the capacity to consider oneself at different times and places,because 6 is necessary for being a moral being, as already remarked,and 9 and 6 together confer on persons their central defining property, considered as persons:their property of being proper objects of reward and punishment with respect to what they do and equally with respect to what they have done in the past.
If consciousness weren’t accompanied by concernment,and in particular by moral concernment (which depends both on 6,temporally extended self-consciousness,and on 9, being “capable of law”,it wouldn’t have this effect. If there were fully explicitly self-conscious,cognitively sophisticated, fully memory-equipped subjects of experience that had no self-concernment,not only no capacity for pleasure and pain, but also more particularly,no grasp of a law,no capacity for happiness or misery based in morality,they wouldn’t be persons,genuine moral persons,although they fulfilled all the clauses of the definition.

Admin
Admin

Messages : 735
Date d'inscription : 2009-01-10
Age : 34

View user profile http://verseau-quinny23.forumactif.com

Back to top Go down

Re: Philosophie...

Post  Admin on Wed 11 Jan - 11:35

Hello everyone!For this week,I’d found a very good book and I share with you the first part… It’s Watchmen and Philosophy:The Politics of power:who watches the watchmen?
Rubble and the Human race:(I’m feeling very similar to that...)
Let’s begin by looking more closely at Dr.Manhattan’s thoughts and actions. A little way into Watchmen,he leaves Earth to reside on Mars. His departure is spurred by public accusations that his presence causes those close to him to develop cancer. (this turns out to be false; the rumor was spread by Ozymandias as part of his plan to eliminate,one way or the other, the heroes who would stand in the way of his grand scheme).But Dr.Manhattan had withdrawn emotionally from the world long before his physical departure, as his partner Laurie Juspeczyk,the second silk spectre, would readily acknowledge. As a result, Dr.Manhattan no longer finds much value in the human race; in particular,he finds it difficult to care about the pressing problem immediately confronting it,that of possibly having to endure a nuclear war,the threat of which is,in part, due to his decision to take up residency on Mars. What exactly is going on with Dr.Manhattan? We’ve just made 3 importants claims.
The first is that he’s having difficulty finding human beings morally valuable. The second is that he’s somehow emotionally absent. And the third is that this absence is the cause of his, let us say,moral ambivalence. Can we defend these assertions?
The fist is the least controversial;in fact, it’s supported outright when Laurie presses her case for Dr.Manhattan to return to Earth: “I mean,ordinary people..All the things that happen to them...Doesn’t that move you more than a bunch of rubble?”Dr.Manhattan replies, “No.I read atoms,Laurie.I see the ancient spectacle that birthed the rubble. Beside this, human life is brief and mundane.” This makes it very pretty clear that Dr.Manhattan doesn’t see human beings as possessing the kind of moral value we think they do.But why doesn’t he?
My suggestion is that Dr.Manhattan’s attitude toward humans is best explained by his lack of some kind of crucial emotional capacity. This idea can be resisted,however. For one thing, we might think that his moral attitude toward humans is simply the result of his supreme intelligence and power,without having anything specific to do with his emotions.That doesn’t seem plausible, though. Concerning his intelligence,it’s true that Dr.Manhattan is able to experience the natural world in a fundamentally different way from how human beings do, he can “read atoms”,after all,but the world he’s in contact with isn’t a mysterious one that ordinary physicists aren’t aware of. Stephen Hawking is well versed in the scope of the cosmos and our tiny place in it,yet he doesn’t consider humans to be morally on a par with rubble. And concerning Dr.Manhattan’s power,we humans have power over young children comparable to what he has over us. And yet we don’t think this makes children morally insignificant. So the explanation of Dr.Manhattan’s moral ambivalence can’t rest solely on the nature of his intelligence or abilities.
A different way to resist our explanatory claim is to point out,rightly,that Dr.Manhattan does experience some emotions;he gets angry during the television interview when he’s falsely accused of being carcinogenic,and he also seems to feel jealousy over Laurie’s budding relationship with Dan Dneiberg,the second Nite Owl. But using the work of philosopher Jesse Prinz,especially as presented in his book the Emotional Construction of morals,we can distinguish moral from nonmoral emotions. According to Prinz,moral emotions,like indignation,are “built up” out of nonmoral ones,like anger. It’s important to note, however, that moral emotions aren’t identical to nonmoral ones,they’re unique.
So we can revise our original idea by claiming that while Dr.Manhattan might possess nonmoral emotions,he lacks moral ones. And this absence isn’t merely a kind of withdrawal. It’s not that Dr.Manhattan is simply depressed. Rather, it seems plausible that the atomic accident that led to his disintegration and subsequent reintegration,while granting him powers almost beyond our imagination, nevertheless robbed him of the capacity to experience moral emotions.

Admin
Admin

Messages : 735
Date d'inscription : 2009-01-10
Age : 34

View user profile http://verseau-quinny23.forumactif.com

Back to top Go down

Re: Philosophie...

Post  Admin on Wed 18 Jan - 13:38

For this week,It’s again in the same way than last week. It’s a very good demonstration to see the morality in everyday life. It’s very interesting and could be a good lesson for humanity… It’s in the same book than last week...
Emotions:they’re not just for breakfast anymore:
But so what? Even if we grant that Dr.Manhattan lacks the capacity to experience these kinds of emotions,how does that explain his inability to value persons properly? In other words, what role do such emotions play in moral reasoning? The answer,according to many philosophers,starting with David Hume (1711-1776),is: quite a lot! Unfortunately,agreement ends there. Emotivists,who see themselves as following in the tradition of Hume,think that moral reasoning (if it even is reasoning) simply amounts to the possession and expression of emotions.
So when we say,”What Ozymandias does at the end of Watchmen is wrong”, all we’re doing is expressing a negative moral emotion,such as indignation,toward his action.
Others think,more plausibly,that moral reasoning has more substance than that;in particular, they think that when we say, “ what Ozymandias does at the end of Watchmen is wrong,” we’re expressing the thought that what he does is wrong,which isn’t just the expression of an emotion. But emotions play an important role in forming such thoughts. Again turning to an idea motivated by Prinz,we can say that we need moral emotions to possess the concepts of moral rightness,wrongness,goodness and badness. So if Dr.Manhattan lacks moral emotions,he no longer possesses the things needed to properly form beliefs about what’s morally right and wrong. And this explains his inability to judge humans as having the value we all believe them as having. It’s worth asking,though,why we should accept the idea that emotions play this central role in moral thinking.
Consider Immanuel Kant (1724-1804),who claimed that the morally right actions are those that conform to the categorical imperative,they’re the actions that treat people as ends in themselves and not merely as means. Although it would take some work, we can determine whether,say,Rorschach’s act of dispensing with Big Figure conforms to the categorical imperative (want to take a guess whether it does?). We can also thereby judge his action as being morally right or wrong without reference to any moral emotions whatsoever. So while we may not in fact lack the relevant emotions needed,because of the way we’re hard-wired,it’s nevertheless possible for us to lack these emotions and yet make moral judgments.
We can challenge this possibility,however. To borrow a gruesome but effective example from Gilbert Harman,imagine that we stumbled upon some people pouring gasoline over a cat,preparing to set it on fire. No doubt,we would judge this action to be wrong. But suppose also that one of us,call her Alice, simply doesn’t feel anything at all upon witnessing the event. No moral outrage,no moral disgust, nothing. Let’s assume she still says the same thing we do:”That’s wrong!” Even so, it seems reasonable to conclude that Alice is merely parroting our words.
She hasn’t really formed and expressed the thought that burning the cat alive is wrong,how could she have,if she feels nothing? Similarly,If Alice appears to judge that the right thing to do is to try to stop these villains but feels absolutely no compulsion to do so,that,too, would suggest that she really doesn’t believe that it’s the right thing to do.And this is because there’s good reason to suppose that moral beliefs are intrinsically motivating; when we form a belief that something is right or wrong,doing so by itself motivates us to action. If emotions are part of that process, then the motivational aspect of forming moral beliefs is easy to appreciate, since emotions often do motivate us to action. Admittedly,these thoughts don’t amount to a knock-down argument against the possibility that persons without emotions can nevertheless hold robust thoughts about what is morally right and wrong and good and bad. But it should make us suspicious that this apparent possibility is in fact a genuine one. We’ll continue,then, with the analysis we’ve been suggesting about what’s wrong with Dr.Manhattan. He lacks the emotions necessary to form appropriate moral judgments and this explains his ambivalence toward the value of persons. Sadly,this isn’t a very uplifting prognosis of his condition,for it suggests that even though Dr.Manhattan has superhuman power and intelligence,he can’t do something important that Joe and Jane Ordinary can:he can’t reason properly about what’s right and wrong. This is a particularly troubling fact, given just how much power Dr.Manhattan has at his disposal;indeed,given his ambitions at the end of Watchmen to create human life somewhere in the Universe;it’s a downright frightening fact. The idea of a morally ambivalent god isn’t comforting.

Admin
Admin

Messages : 735
Date d'inscription : 2009-01-10
Age : 34

View user profile http://verseau-quinny23.forumactif.com

Back to top Go down

Re: Philosophie...

Post  Admin on Thu 26 Jan - 12:47

Hello everyone!For this week,it’s again in the same book and in continuity of… It’s very true et deep… This week is very difficult because of someone in my neighborhood… He’s very hard to endure and it’s asking me a lot of energy… I have a lot of stress on my shoulders and it’s hard to support. I’m very tired of it.
Sure,it’s the right thing to do,now tell me why I should do it?
Whether Dr.Manhattan is himself capable of adequately thinking about right and wrong,it’s nevertheless reasonable to think that he’s subject to the very same moral mandates,permissions,and restrictions that the rest of us are subject to. Put succinctly,Dr.Manhattan has an obligation to do the right thing and to avoid doing the wrong thing. So if, returning to Kant for a moment,it’s true that we have an obligation to act in ways that treat people as ends and not merely as means,then Dr.Manhattan has that obligation too. And if we therefore wouldn’t have been permitted to kill Rorschach at the end of Watchmen just because we disagreed with his decision to expose Ozymandias, then Dr.Manhattan wasn’t permitted to do so, either. His supreme intelligence and power,his god-like standing,don’t exempt him from being held to the same moral standards that the rest of us are held to, whatever those might end up being.
This is a compelling line of thought,summed up nicely by the slogan that no one is above the moral law.But it invites a further question.Why,exactly,is no one above it? Even by philosophical standards,this is a deep question.It’s asking,in essence,what the grounds of morality are, what gives moral principles their force over us? And it’s particularly important to consider this question as it concerns Dr.Manhattan,since we ourselves habe no way of enforcing moral obligations on him should he choose not to follow them. How does one punish or reward someone who’s able to create worlds and simply think people into nonexistence?
We can therefore imagine Dr.Manhattan asking,”Given my intelligence and power,why should I do what morality demands?” One answer that some might find appealing is to say that morality gets its force from God. This divine command theory of ethics,as it’s often called,claims both that God “bestows” actions with moral properties such as rightness and wrongness and that what compels us to act morally,what gives us an obligation to do the right thing and to avoid doing the wrong thing, is the fact that God wills it.
This response grounds the demands of morality on the existence of God,but even for believers, it isn’t a very good way to go. Dr.Manhattan seems pretty skeptical about the existence of God,saying that “existence is random, has no pattern” and referring to the universe as “a clock without a craftsman.” So the divine command theorist would have to convince Dr.Manhattan that God exists before providing him with a reason to take the moral law seriously. And given the notorious difficulties with “proving” the existence of God,this approach isn’t strategically smart.Moreover, it’s unclear exactly why God’s willing that certain actions are right and wrong should hold any sway over what Dr.Manhattan does.

Admin
Admin

Messages : 735
Date d'inscription : 2009-01-10
Age : 34

View user profile http://verseau-quinny23.forumactif.com

Back to top Go down

Re: Philosophie...

Post  Admin on Fri 3 Feb - 8:17

Hello every one,it has been a hard week again,sorry if I’m late but I’d been very occupied these last days… We had a terrorist attack earlier this week over muslims… The mentality on this event is diversified and suprising… For me,it’s just karmic laws in effect,for others it’s something else,near of where I live,we have a mosque where some children had put the symbol of peace on the front door… I’d found it very strange because muslims aren’t very 60’s or 70’s in their kind and I’m not sure they appreciate this symbol associates with John Lennon and his generation...A race who hadn’t known peace since when? I’m strongly disagree with the teaching they has received… The “jihad mentality” isn’t current with John Lennon generation… And because you don’t have studied the effect of the number of them in a country and his influence… It has been demonstrated all around the globe the “muslim effect” growing with their number… Because the morality of their religion is very different then us,what differenciates good from evil is very different… But Trudeau don’t seems to realize or to understand that…
For this week,I’ll be very concise… I continue in the same book then the last 2 weeks,after I’ll pass to another one’s. But in the circumstances,it’s appropriate and it’s a good metaphor of what’s happening…
He might rightfully ask what it’s about God that gives God’s will this importance in his life.Perhaps it’s the threat of God’s wrath.But that threat loses much of its force when it’s directed against a being as powerful as Dr.Manhattan is. Maybe instead it’s the nature of God that gives God’s will its binding force. But the all-knowing,all-powerful nature of God is something Dr.Manhattan more on less shares,so he might understandably wonder why his own will isn’t as effective as God’s in this matter.
Kant offers a different approach.For him,all rational creatures are subject to acting in accordance with the categorical imperative,and that’s because the demand of morality is a rational one;it is,according to Kant,irrational not to act morally. The irrationality doesn’t so much have to do with acting against one’s self-interest,but in willing or affirming contradictions. What does that mean? The details are unfortunately quite thorny.Happily,we needn’t concern ourselves with them,but unhappily,that’s because it doesn’t seem likely that Kant’s approach will work in the case of Dr.Manhattan.
And that’s because,however the specific story goes about why acting morally amounts to acting rationally,it assumes that morality only binds rational agents. And it’s not clear that Dr.Manhattan is rational! Here’s why. No one’s questioning the intellect of Dr.Manhattan.
But for him to count as fully rational sway over him,he needs to possess the conceptual apparatus necessary for forming moral thoughts. This is why,in Kant’s view,nonhuman animals aren’t subject to the moral law;while they can certainly reason about certain things, they’re not fully rational,because they lack certain conceptual capabilities.Now Kant thinks that one doesn’t need moral emotions to be able to form moral thoughts,but we disagree and have previously provided reasons supporting our position. If that’s right, however, then Dr.Manhattan shares the same lot that nonhuman animals do when it comes to the moral law. He isn’t subject to it,because he isn’t fully rational.

Admin
Admin

Messages : 735
Date d'inscription : 2009-01-10
Age : 34

View user profile http://verseau-quinny23.forumactif.com

Back to top Go down

Re: Philosophie...

Post  Admin on Thu 9 Feb - 10:31

Hello everyone! For this week,I’ll stay again in the same bookThe politics of power:who watches the watchmen?
In another part…
From the personal to the political:
Let’s proceed,then,by assuming that Dr.Manhattan has the same moral responsibilities that the rest of us do. Our last question is what responsibilities the US has in light of the fact that Dr.Manhattan has signed on as an official military asset. This is a question of political morality and it concerns the moral mandates,permissions,and restrictions that states have toward one another. Specifically,we want to know whether the US,given the huge strategic advantage and it has with Dr.Manhattan in its employ, is morally permitted to adopt a “double-standard” when it comes to its international behavior,insisting that other nations behave in ways that it doesn’t.
It might seem that we’ve already answered this question.If Dr.Manhattan himself isn’t above the moral law in virtue of his power and intellect,it seems only reasonable to conclude that the US isn’t above the moral law in virtue of the power it inherits from his service. That certainly should be our default position,but it’s important to point out that political morality is different from personal morality.
Nations aren’t persons,and so it’s not necessarily inconsistent to claim that while Dr.Manhattan has to play by the same moral rules that every other person has to play by, the US as a country doesn’t have to play by the same moral rules that other countries have to. Just because we’ve taken a stand on a question involving personal morality doesn’t mean we are thereby committed to taking the same stand on a question involving political morality. It’s also important to keep in mind that we’re not primarily concerned with what it’s permissible for Dr.Manhattan himself to do, acting alone, when it comes to international affairs. Since he’s employed by the US government, he has subjected his will to its will when acting in a military capacity. So our question, again, is what it’s permissible for the US to do,given the hyper-power it’s become due to Dr.Manhattan’s service. We aren’t concerned with whether Dr.Manhattan ought to involve himself personally in international affairs,beyond the legitimate mandate he receives by acting as an agent of the US.
Having said that, why in the world should we think that the US is morally permitted to do things others nations aren’t,like,say,engaging in preventive wars and advancing protectionist economic policies.
David Luban,although an opponent of the double-standard view of American policy, has examined some of the arguments that have been mustered in its defense. He first points out that if the idea is going to be plausible at all, it best not be justified along the lines of, “The US is permitted to do it because it can get away with it.”If that’s the whole story, that’s no story at all. But there are more compelling reasons to think that a hyper-power is permitted to act on the international stage in ways other countries aren’t. One line of reasoning Luban looks at claims that the best way of promoting the emergence of more democracies,of advancing more economic stability,and of securing more meaningful freedoms,all very good things,no doubt, is for the US to act in its own self-interest, involving itself in the affairs of other nationsin a way that’s impermissible for other nations to do. Another line of reasoning explored by Luban claims that the US is granted permissions other nations don’t have because it endures costs that other nations don’t. By acting as the “sheriff”,it makes itself more of a target and puts US soldiers and resources on the line. The idea is that the more it is willing to risk losing,the more costs it’s willing to take on,the more permissions it gains.
Neither of these arguments are very compelling, though. Luban rightly points out that the first one rests heavily on a dubious assumption, namely,that every time the US acts in a self-beneficial way on the world stage,it also somehow promotes good things beyond its borders. Sometimes this is undoubtedly true, but surely not always. And even if it were always true,the reasoning involved faces a more fundamental flaw when the role of Dr.Manhattan’s service to his country is taken into account.

Admin
Admin

Messages : 735
Date d'inscription : 2009-01-10
Age : 34

View user profile http://verseau-quinny23.forumactif.com

Back to top Go down

Re: Philosophie...

Post  Admin on Fri 3 Mar - 11:24

Hello everyone!I’m in better shape now I had moved in a little loft very comfortable.I’m feeling home here...And it’s good. It was the better choice to do,I’m sure,a lot of stress in less in my life by this movement.
I’ll continue in the same way than when I leaved you last time… It talks about justice and punishment… It’s interesting…
Evil must be punished:Retributivism,basically: “The city is dying of rabies.Is the best I can do to wipe random flecks of foam from its lips? Never despair.Never surrender.” Rorchach’s journal.
What compels Rorschach? If it were mere vengeance,a thirst for revenge,or simple hatred,he would be a much less interesting character. If all he wanted to do was hurt people out of sadistic urges and over it with the name of justice, reminiscent of Hooded Justice ,he would be easy to ignore or condemn. But there’s so much more to Rorschach. His motives are pure;it’s about justice,right, and the moral order. In this way, he reflects what is desirable about retributivism:the guilty must be punished because they are guilty, and their punishment should be proportionate to their crimes. This sentiment is common, even if its justification is difficult to articulate. Retributivism comes in many different varieties,but most basic formulations seem to include 3 elements:1)only the guilty are to be punished, that’s,you punish someone only for a voluntary wrongdoing;2)the punishment must be equivalent to the wickedness done; 3)the justification for punishing persons is that the return of suffering from wrong doing is itself morally good.The idea is that if someone causes harm or inflicts suffering on another,this warrants punishment, and the punishment ought to fit the severity of the wrongdoer’s misdeeds. Some argue that there is no deeper justification for retributivism,that it’s impossible to prove but nonetheless true. It’s simply just to return like for like; paying wrongdoers back is both justified and good.

Admin
Admin

Messages : 735
Date d'inscription : 2009-01-10
Age : 34

View user profile http://verseau-quinny23.forumactif.com

Back to top Go down

Re: Philosophie...

Post  Admin on Fri 10 Mar - 8:05

Hi everyone!I’m very happy of my choice again… It was the better thing to do...I moved in another place with my appartment to me. This week it’s another part of the same book then last week… It’s again philosophical…
Kant and Rorschach on respect and dignity:
“We don’t do this because it’s permitted.We do it because we have to. We do it because we are compelled.” Rorschach 1985
Kant stated simply enough,”Punishment must always be inflicted upon the criminal only because he has committed a crime.”
Punishment shouldn’t be meted out for the criminal’s own good,for example, for reformation or rehabilitation. This would be treating him like an animal,like a dog. Also,punishment shouldn’t be handed out for the good of society,such as for security, deterrence,or crime prevention or any other desirable end. The criminal shouldn’t be treated as a mere means; we shouldn’t use people for society’s ends, “for a human being can never be treated merely as a means to the purposes of another.”By this, Kant meant that people deserve respect. But why respect criminals? Didn’t they lose this right? To understand why criminals must be punished because of what they did, and why their punishment must respect them as moral agents,that’s, as wrongdoers to be held accountable for their actions, we need to look briefly at Kant’s ethics.
The aspects of Kant’s moral system we are most interested in are best illustrated by one of the versions of his famous categorical imperative:”So act that you use humanity,whether in your own person or in the person of any other,always at the same time as an end,never merely as a means.” Here in lay 2 fundamental concepts for Kant:dignity and respect. All human beings insofar as they are autonomous,that is,can be the author of their own actions and determine the principles on which they’ll act,possess inherent dignity.

Admin
Admin

Messages : 735
Date d'inscription : 2009-01-10
Age : 34

View user profile http://verseau-quinny23.forumactif.com

Back to top Go down

Re: Philosophie...

Post  Admin on Fri 17 Mar - 10:17

Hello everyone,for this week,I’ll continue in the same way again than last week,because it’s a very good reflection…
They can decide to act on those principles,or maxims,that correspond with the “moral law” as described by the categorical imperative,or they can act out of selfish desires and self-interest and hence act immorally. Each person’s capacity to make this choice proves his or her moral value or dignity, and by virtue of this dignity, persons deserve respect,to be treated always as valuable ends in themselves and never only as means to someone else’s ends.So basically,our status as dignified,moral agents obligates others to respect us and limits how they may treat us. And yes,criminals are people too. Furthermore,in order to treat the criminal as a human being with dignity,we can punish him only if he has committed a crime.To punish him only if merely to send a signal to others, or for any other consequentialistic or utilitarian reason, is to use him merely as a means,and this is unacceptable,regardless of whom we are punishing.As Kant said,”the law of punishment is a categorical imperative,and woe to him who crawls through the windings of eudaemonism in order to discover something that releases the criminal from punishment or even reduces its amount by the advantage it promises… for justice ceases to be justice if it can be bought for any price whatsoever.” But if we don’t punish criminals for their own good,for society’s benefit, or because it makes us feel better,then why do we do it?Why must we punish the guilty?
Tesla said:Virtues and failures are inseparable,if the man separates them,there’s no man anymore…
Order and Value in a Morally Blank world:
“The void breathed hard on my heart,turning its illusions to ice,shattering them. Was reborn then, free to scraul own design on this morally blanck world.”Rorschach.
What if society was founded on a set of values such as dignity and respect? These fundamental values would give human endeavors and human life their meaning,and maintaining them would be essential. In such a world,punishment would be, perhaps paradoxically, a reaffirmation of these values,mending the social fabric that was torn asunder by criminal wrongdoing.
Consider a trivial Rorschach example:his chastisement of Moloch for owning illegal prescription drugs and unregistered firearm.We might ask,”Why do you care? He isn’t hurting anybody,right?”

Admin
Admin

Messages : 735
Date d'inscription : 2009-01-10
Age : 34

View user profile http://verseau-quinny23.forumactif.com

Back to top Go down

Re: Philosophie...

Post  Admin on Fri 24 Mar - 10:53

Hello everybody,the spring is here and I’m happy. For this week,it’s a new book and it was very interesting to see how wars and knowledge and evolution are very closed.
Science Wars:What scientists know and how they know it/prof.Steven L.Goldman.
Modern science began as a method for solving problem of knowledge,knowledge of nature,but soon promoted itself as the only rational response to experience,alone capable of knowledge of the true causes of experience. This “imperialism” pitted science against all other claimants to knowledge,truth,and rationality,triggering the science wars that marked the late 20th century.
These wars arrayed humanist intellectuals and many social scientists against natural scientists over the very possibility of objective knowledge. Concurrently,science and religion clashed over the truth of evolutionary theory,and bitter political disputes erupted over the role science could or should play in public policy decisions.
Differentiating knowledge from opinions and beliefs is a problem that was well known to classical Greek philosophers and has played a contentious role in Western cultural history. Is there such a thing as knowledge,and if there’s,who possesses it,how do they get it,and what power does it give them?
I.What is it that scientists know,and how do they know?
A.In the late 1950s,the natural sciences had,after 350 years,arrived at he very center of social power and influence.
1.Natural scientists conceived of science as having monopoly on knowledge,truth,and reason,a monopoly on disclosing reality.
2.The justification for this claim was the explanatory and predictive power of scientific theories and the increasing control over nature these theories have given us through their association and technological innovation.
3.Concurrently,science became entrenched in commercial,governmental,educational institutions,leading to a broad public identification of scientific research with social and economic progress.

Admin
Admin

Messages : 735
Date d'inscription : 2009-01-10
Age : 34

View user profile http://verseau-quinny23.forumactif.com

Back to top Go down

Re: Philosophie...

Post  Admin on Fri 31 Mar - 10:54

Hello everyone!For this week it’s another reading of Science Wars…
I’m very happy in my new home with my cat. It’s costly but I have a form of life. In politic,I’m shameful to be Canadian right now… The free speech is disappearing and the truth too and it’s a real denial of the facts and reality under the pretext of “equality”...And it’s a proof of the stupidity and of someone who don’t know what he talks about in Canadian government,but what was the father,is the son...He should be agree if his son is raped at the age of 10 by a refugee...Just like it happened in Sweden and in Uk too...And in Germany and France too…
B.The relationship between science and society had changed dramatically in the 20th century, and by the 1960s,science was riding higher socially,politically,and culturally than ever before in its history.
1.By making technological innovation the basis of profitability,industry became increasingly dependent on science-based engineering,as well as on research scientists.
2.The dependence of industry on science and technology transformed postsecondary education at a time when social changes drove an unprecedented demand for postsecondary education.
3.Governments became increasingly dependent on science-related technologies for military applications,and science advice became more and more central to potentially divisise public issues,from Sputnik and nuclear power to global warming and stem cell research.
C.At the peak of its social,political,and economic power,natural science came under attack on a broad front.
1.In the 1960s, (natural) science came under attack as a “tool” of political,militarist,and corporate interests whose funding made scientific research subservient to parochial institutional agendas.
2.Concurrently,an intellectual critique,which resulted in the proclamation of “Science Wars”,was launched that challenged the objectivity of scientific knowledge and the claim that scientific knowledge was value-neutral and validated by correspondence with reality.
3.Quite independently of this intellectual critique,science was attacked by a resurgent religious fundamentalism that rejected the uniqueness of scientific truth claims.
II.The post-1960 science wars were an expression of a conflict internal to modern science that’s itself best understood as a deep conflict within western philosophy.
A.We must understand what scientists mean when they use the word know before we can assess the truth of scientific knowledge claims and their implications for society.
1.Western philosophy essentially begins with a “war” over the definition of reason, over the claim that these is such a thing as knowledge,which is superior to belief and opinion because it’s certain and universal.
2.Plato and Aristotle defended the existence of such knowledge against the sophists:relativists and skeptics who argued that there were only more or less probable beliefs and opinions,but no knowledge.
3.The battle over the definition of reason in Plato’s dialogues the sophist is, thus, the original science war.

Admin
Admin

Messages : 735
Date d'inscription : 2009-01-10
Age : 34

View user profile http://verseau-quinny23.forumactif.com

Back to top Go down

Re: Philosophie...

Post  Admin on Fri 7 Apr - 13:49

Hello everyone!For this week,it’s in continuity with the Science wars...It’s very actual in the events which happens all around the globe. If you want to learn more in this way,I invite you to see my facebook page and my posts or my blug on tumblr and/or twitter…
They made deductive reasoning,the form of reasoning used in mathematics,the form of reasoning used in mathematics,the form of reasoning linking thought and reality.
What emerged from all this was a definition of knowledge as that about which we could not be wrong,thus that which was certain,necessary,and universal,just like the theorems Of Euclidean geometry,and a revelation of reality.
Thus,what scientists know is what is real and true.
And what if knowledge isn’t possible?What about the arguments of the Sophists,relativists,and skeptics?
The opponents of the Platonic-Aristotelian view argued that human reasoners were limited to beliefs and opinions.
Beliefs and opinions are inevitably uncertain,more or less probable,and context dependent,or particular.
The founders of modern science were well aware of these knowledge “battles”,and modern science is intrinsically ambivalent about the reality of scientific knowledge,making the science wars inevitable.
How do we propose to explore the science wars?
The approach adopted here is historical,with the objective of allowing an informed assessment of the status of scientific claims to knowledge and truth.Why use a historical approach,rather than a contemporary analytical one?
A historical approach allows us to “watch” the problem of knowledge changing over time, correlative with developments in science and in philosophy and with the changing science-society relationship.
It also reveals that conflict among competing conceptions of the problem of knowledge and proposed solutions to it is an ongoing process internal to science.
The perception that knowledge poses a problem for science truly does have a history:there’s more here than merely telling a story in time.
From the generation of Descartes and Galileo until the end of the 19th century,we’ll see that it was primarily scientists who responded to this problem as a problem for science.
In the 20th centuryby contrast,we’ll see that responsibility for solving the problem posed by scientific knowledge shifted to philosophers.
We’ll “watch” as philosophy,history,and sociology of science emerge as subspecialities devoted to clarifying and solving this problem, with scientists decisively out of the loop on their own problem!

Admin
Admin

Messages : 735
Date d'inscription : 2009-01-10
Age : 34

View user profile http://verseau-quinny23.forumactif.com

Back to top Go down

Re: Philosophie...

Post  Sponsored content


Sponsored content


Back to top Go down

Page 12 of 13 Previous  1, 2, 3 ... , 11, 12, 13  Next

View previous topic View next topic Back to top


 
Permissions in this forum:
You cannot reply to topics in this forum